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BROADENING  CONSUMER  LAW:  COMPETITION,
PROTECTION,  AND  DISTRIBUTION
Rory Van Loo*
Policymakers and scholars have in distributional conversations traditionally ignored con-
sumer laws, defined as the set of consumer protection, antitrust, and entry-barrier laws that
govern consumer transactions.  Consumer law is overlooked partly because tax law is cast as the
most efficient way to redistribute.  Another obstacle is that consumer law research speaks to
microeconomic and siloed contexts—deceptive fees by Wells Fargo or a proposed merger between
Comcast and Time Warner Cable.  Even removing millions of dollars of deceptive credit card fees
across the nation seems trivial compared to the trillion-dollar growth in income inequality that
has sparked concern in recent decades.  This Article synthesizes the fragmented empirical litera-
ture to offer a broader conception of consumer law’s place in governance.  The data indicate that
consumer market failures raise prices to consumers by well over a trillion dollars annually, aided
by sophisticated algorithmic pricing; that this overcharge worsens economic inequality; and that
consumer law, despite prominent critiques of its shortcomings, can reduce overcharge when
designed well.  The preliminary state of the evidence underscores the need for regulatory monitor-
ing of markets to calibrate consumer law’s potential as a tax alternative.  Redistribution is one of
the government’s most basic functions, and efficiency one of the law’s guiding principles.  There
are strong normative foundations for making macroeconomic distribution an explicit goal of
consumer law.
© 2019 Rory Van Loo.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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(2018).  Jacob Axelrod, Caroline Blake, Samuel Burgess, Phoebe Dantoin, Christopher
Hamilton, Tyler Stites, and Gavin Tullis provided excellent research assistance.  Earlier
drafts were titled “Consumer Law as Tax Alternative.”
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INTRODUCTION
Leaders of both major U.S. political parties and multinational CEOs are
looking for solutions to economic inequality.1  Concern stems not only from
an egalitarian impulse, and the imperative of reducing poverty, but from the
belief that growing inequality is a threat to societal stability.2  Leading pro-
posals seek redistribution through tax law,3 in accordance with the “domi-
nant position in tax law and policy” that redistribution should occur through
1 See, e.g., Heather Long, Even the 1% Are Worried About Inequality, WASH. POST, Jan. 23,
2018, at A12; Damian Paletta, Economic Mobility Is New Flashpoint—Both Parties Agree the
Opportunity Gap Is Widening, but the Proposed Solutions Are Starkly Different, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8,
2014, at A4.
2 See, e.g., WORLD ECON. FORUM, GLOBAL RISKS REPORT 4, 6 (12th ed. 2017), http://
www3.weforum.org/docs/GRR17_Report_web.pdf (surveying roughly 750 World Eco-
nomic Forum stakeholders and reporting “rising income and wealth disparity” as the lead-
ing trend driving risks (emphasis omitted)); Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, Income
Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment, 40 EUR. ECON. REV. 1203, 1204 (1996) (find-
ing that income inequality likely leads to sociopolitical instability); Joseph Fishkin & Wil-
liam E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 669, 669 (2014) (arguing
that economic inequality subverts democracy).  The causal relationships between inequal-
ity and instability are complex and understanding is still in development.
3 See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 471 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., Harv. Univ. Press 2014) (2013) (“[T]he ideal policy for avoiding an
endless inegalitarian spiral and regaining control over the dynamics of accumulation
would be a progressive global tax on capital.”); Thomas B. Edsall, The Republican Discovery of
the Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/11/opinion/
thomas-b-edsall-the-republican-discovery-of-the-poor.html (discussing Republican propos-
als to address inequality through tax reform).
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taxes because—though taxes still cause inefficiency—taxes are seen as less
inefficient than most legal rules.4
This Article explores another path to large-scale redistribution that—
unlike increasing taxes—does not require legislation and readily improves
efficiency: consumer law.5  In particular, many consumer protection and
antitrust laws reduce the prices that people pay by removing overcharge.6  In
an informal but intuitive sense, overcharge is the difference between actual
prices and prices that would exist absent some act identified as anticompeti-
tive—such as a monopolistic merger or deceptive sales practice.7  For
instance, consumer protection laws have recently stopped Amazon and
Facebook from charging children up to thousands of dollars in fees for in-
app purchases while playing video games, and made it more difficult for
banks to steer borrowers toward high-priced loans.8  Although the field often
focuses on goals other than lowering prices, many consumer laws nonethe-
less lower overcharge in diverse ways, including by addressing monopoly
power, preventing deception, and removing entry barriers that get in the way
of full competition.
At first glance, consumer law seems an unlikely solution to be left out of
distributional conversations.  Scholars broadly recognize that consumer law
4 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income
Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667–68 (1994) (putting forth the theory
that legal rules should seek to efficiently regulate, leaving distributional goals to the tax
system); Chris William Sanchirico, Tax Eclecticism, 64 TAX L. REV. 149, 224 (2011) (calling
the double-distortion approach the “dominant position in tax law and policy”).  Despite
this dominance, legal scholars have proposed other routes to addressing inequality. See,
e.g., Kate Andrias, An American Approach to Social Democracy: The Forgotten Promise of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 128 YALE L.J. 616 (2019).
5 Scholars have begun to link consumer-protection-related overcharge to inequality
in a subset of markets. See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT 26 (2012) (dis-
cussing distorted pricing in mortgages, cellphones, and credit cards and stating that in
some cases there will be a “regressive distributional effect.”); Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth
Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 64 (2008) (synthesizing the research on
consumer finance); Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big
Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1311–12 (2015) (summarizing consumer finance research
and concluding that a lack of consumer protection regulation regressively redistributes
resources).  These discussions have yet to do what antitrust scholars have—make the case
that consumer protection by itself could dramatically reduce inequality.
6 Other consumer laws that influence the prices paid include government licensing,
which restricts who may participate in an industry. See infra Section I.C.
7 Perfectly competitive prices are at marginal cost, just high enough to motivate firms
to produce the equilibrium quantity and give firm owners a competitive return on
investment.
8 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code) (impos-
ing restrictions on mortgages); FTC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C14-1038-JCC, 2016
WL10654030, at *8 (W.D. Wash. July 22, 2016); I.B. ex rel. Fife v. Facebook, Inc., 905 F.
Supp. 2d 989, 996 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (charging in a class action that in-app purchases by
minors on Facebook, which sometimes reached in the thousands of dollars, violated con-
sumer protection laws).
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can reduce inequality by reducing both the prices that lower income consum-
ers pay and the profits that wealthier business owners receive.9  Consumer
law has also in recent years captured the public spotlight, between Wells
Fargo opening millions of fake accounts in customers’ names, and a renais-
sance in antitrust driven by the dominant position of technology firms such
as Amazon, Facebook, and Google.10  Moreover, the economic significance
of consumer markets is undeniable.  Consumers spend about $14 trillion
annually on everything from laundry detergent at Walmart, to internet ser-
vices from Comcast, to a new Honda Civic from the local auto dealer.11
Since consumer spending makes up two-thirds of GDP, consumer law may be
the single most significant area of economic regulation.12
Nonetheless, consumer law risks being underestimated as a tool for dis-
tribution in three main ways.  First, policy makers and scholars possess lim-
ited awareness of how much consumers overpay—and thus whether the total
is large enough to matter for inequality.  Those who quantify consumer-pro-
tection-related overcharge tend to study single instances of a particular com-
pany charging many of its customers a small amount, such as Verizon
deceptively inserting fees of about $10 into the monthly bills for unautho-
rized ring tones.13  In contrast with the microeconomic lens of consumer law,
macroeconomic tax tools dominate federal policymaking on distributional
issues.  Widespread alarm about inequality stems from data suggesting that
the top one percent of households now earn about twenty percent of all
9 See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Rebecca Stone, Pricing Misperceptions: Explaining Pricing
Structure in the Cell Phone Service Market, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 430, 453–54 (2012)
(observing that strategically higher cellphone prices exploiting consumer psychology con-
stitute a potentially troubling form of regressive redistribution); Einer Elhauge, Essay, Hori-
zontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1267 (2016) (agreeing with the large number
of economists who have concluded that anticompetitive pricing contributes to economic
inequality); Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, The Provider Monopoly Problem in
Health Care, 89 OR. L. REV. 847, 848 (2011) (“Monopoly in health care markets . . . has
redistributive effects that are especially burdensome for consumers.”).
10 Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Fined for Setting Up Sham Accounts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9,
2016, at B1; see also Joshua D. Wright et al., Requiem for a Paradox: The Dubious Rise and
Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293, 294 (2019).
11 See Table 2.3.5. Personal Consumption Expenditures by Major Type of Product, BUREAU
ECON. ANALYSIS, https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=19&step=2#reqid=19&
step=2&isuri=1&1921=survey (open “Section 2-Personal Income and Outlays” menu; then
follow hyperlink to Table 2.3.5) (last updated Sept. 26, 2019) [hereinafter Table 2.3.5]
(estimating annualized total consumer spending at $13.9 trillion in 2018).
12 See Household Final Consumption Expenditure, etc. (% of GDP), INDEX MUNDI, https://
www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/NE.CON.PETC.ZS (last visited Sept. 28, 2019)
(showing that Americans’ household consumption spending exceeded 68% of GDP in
2016).
13 See, e.g., Moore v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., No. C 09-1823, 2010 WL 3619877, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2010) (holding plaintiffs pleaded sufficient facts based on allegations
that Verizon billed and collected “millions of dollars of unauthorized charges”); Stipulated
Final Judgment and Order at 11–12, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Cellco P’ship, No.
3:15-cv-03268 (D.N.J. June 9, 2015) (requiring that Verizon pay $70 million in refunds to
overcharged customers).
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income, a figure that has increased dramatically since 1980 by an amount
that gives them between one and two trillion dollars more annually than they
would earn if the numbers had held constant.14  It is not immediately clear to
policymakers and scholars looking for ways to move over a trillion dollars
around how a few dollars of overcharge per gasoline purchase, or even a few
billion dollars rolled up in a given market, is worthy of attention.  The obser-
vation that “[l]aw and economics should be called law and microeconomics”
is particularly apt for consumer law.15
A second major challenge for understanding the importance of con-
sumer law to inequality is uncertainty and ambiguity about the distributional
impact of overcharge.  Legal scholars generally agree that “market power
accrue[s] primarily to shareholders and the top executives, who are wealthier
on average than the median consumer.”16  However, consumer law’s empha-
sis is on the micro-level harms to consumers, rather than the macro-level
implications of those harms.  Moreover, even for those who would recognize
a relationship between inequality and consumer law, there is an open ques-
tion about the magnitude of consumer law’s impact on inequality.  After all,
middle-income households also have ownership stakes in large companies,
most notably through their retirement accounts.17  In other words, even if
consumer law could reduce overcharge significantly, would it reduce the
amount of inequality significantly?
A final challenge remains even for those recognizing the magnitude and
inequality implications of overcharge: the widespread belief that taxes are a
better option.  The preference for taxes is largely about efficiency,18 but even
once that intellectual barrier is overcome there remains another, less well
understood internal obstacle.  High-profile scholarship has cast doubt on the
effectiveness of consumer market regulations.  The most prevalent policy
tool, mandated disclosure, leads to “unintended consequences that often
14 See Thomas Piketty et al., Distributional National Accounts: Methods and Estimates for
The United States 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22945, 2016),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w22945.pdf (giving the rising income share of the top one
percent); Table 2.1. Personal Income and Its Disposition, BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS, https://
apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=19&step=2#reqid=19&step=2&isuri=1&1921=sur
vey (open “Section 2-Personal Income and Outlays” menu; then follow hyperlink to Table
2.1) (last updated Sept. 26, 2019) [hereinafter Table 2.1.5] (reporting national income
figures).
15 See Yair Listokin, Law and Macroeconomics, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (Feb. 10, 2017),
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2017/02/law-and-macroeconomics.
16 Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality, 104
GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 11–12 (2015). But see Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust and Wealth Inequality,
101 CORNELL L. REV. 1171, 1171, 1183 (2016) (challenging arguments for more antitrust
enforcement to address inequality).  Nobel-prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz has
argued that corporate rents, along with corporate governance, access to healthcare, the tax
structure, and other areas, contribute to economic inequality. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE
PRICE OF INEQUALITY 92, 97 (2012).
17 See, e.g., Crane, supra note 16, at 1187.
18 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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harm the very people it intends to serve.”19  Another approach, changing the
default fees imposed on consumers unless they approve, has proven ineffec-
tual because businesses can convince people to opt in to harmful practices—
making what were supposed to be sticky beneficial defaults “slippery.”20
These critiques yield valuable insights, but contribute to an influential and
ultimately incomplete narrative of consumer market regulation’s “spectacu-
lar” failures.21
This Article addresses that underestimation by piecing together discon-
nected micro-level, and discipline-specific research that collectively illumi-
nates consumer law’s macro-level impact on inequality.  Along the way, it also
fills several gaps crucial to the big-picture analysis.  Most notably, there has
been far less attention paid to consumer protection’s aggregate impact on
inequality compared to antitrust.  Unlike consumer protection scholars, anti-
trust scholars have taken a broader lens of their field across the entire econ-
omy, concluding that “[a] revived antitrust movement could play an
important role in reversing the dramatic rise in economic inequality.”22
The same basic reasoning underlying that view on antitrust applies to
consumer protection laws, the violation of which can also bring considerable
profits to large companies.23  If consumers save one hundred dollars annu-
ally on their cellphone plans due to better consumer protection, that out-
come has similar distributional effects as if they saved one hundred dollars
through better antitrust enforcement.24  To move toward a more compre-
hensive view of consumer law’s potential to reduce inequality that includes
consumer protection—not just antitrust—this Article undertakes the first
synthesis of consumer-protection-related overcharge studies scattered across
various markets, including cellphones, food, and insurance.25  The limited
empirical research suggests that the elimination of consumer-protection-
19 Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 647, 647, 651–65 (2011) (arguing that the widespread societal reliance on requir-
ing businesses to provide information to people has failed, in part because people often
ignore or misuse that information); see also Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral
Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1638 (2014) (“Mandating new
forms of disclosure is unlikely to significantly improve outcomes when (1) the underlying
contractual complexity would remain and (2) firms have strong incentives to undermine
choice in response to the required disclosures.”).
20 Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1174
(2013).
21 Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 19, at 647 (“This Article explores the spectacu-
lar prevalence, and failure, of the single most common technique for protecting personal
autonomy in modern society: mandated disclosure.”).  To be clear, these critiques still
identify ways that consumer law might prove more successful. See, e.g., id. at 746–47.
22 Lina M. Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust Coun-
terrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 237 (2017); see also TIMOTHY
WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS (2018).
23 See infra Section II.B (reviewing the literature).
24 See infra Part II.
25 See infra Part I.
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related overcharge would plausibly put over a trillion dollars back into con-
sumers’ pockets.26
In terms of the impact of that overcharge on consumption inequality,
this Article contributes a more comprehensive treatment of the literature
and an original analysis of the data. The poor and less educated are particu-
larly susceptible to some predatory business practices, while households
outside of the top one percent of earners own a disproportionately smaller
percent of businesses.  For these and other reasons, the preliminary data
indicate that consumer overcharge has a potentially large enough regressive
impact to account for a great portion of the trillion-dollar increase in ine-
quality that has caused so much concern.
Finally, this Article shows how consumer law offers a potentially appeal-
ing alternative to taxes.  As a threshold issue, consumer law does not fit into
the category of distortionary laws that has contributed to legal scholars’ his-
torical overwhelming preference for tax law for distributional goals.27  Con-
sumer laws that address overcharge can make markets more competitive, and
thus remove or prevent distortions.28  As a result, in theory consumer law
offers greater appeal than solely using the tax code to address inequality,
because tax increases on the wealthy are seen as inefficient and a drag on the
economy (or a distortion).29  Reducing consumer overcharge is a win-win
policy option because it can improve both equality and efficiency.
But consumer law must still work effectively to provide such benefits and
be seen as a legitimate alternative to tax law.  To address the lack of attention
to consumer law effectiveness,30 this Article reviews the evidence showing
that well-designed consumer regulation can significantly reduce over-
26 Id.
27 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 667–68.  A number of scholars have chal-
lenged the reliance on the tax system for addressing redistribution.  See, e.g., John Brooks
et al., Cross-Subsidies: Government’s Hidden Pocketbook, 106 GEO. L.J. 1229 (2018); Matthew
Dimick, Should the Law Do Anything About Economic Inequality?, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
1 (2016); Brian Galle, Is Local Consumer Protection Law a Better Redistributive Mechanism than
the Tax System?, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 525, 526 (2010); David Gamage, How Should
Governments Promote Distributive Justice?: A Framework for Analyzing the Optimal Choice of Tax
Instruments, 68 TAX L. REV. 1, 75 (2014); Richard L. Revesz, Regulation and Distribution, 93
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489, 1492 (2018); Zachary Liscow, Note, Reducing Inequality on the Cheap:
When Legal Rule Design Should Incorporate Equity as Well as Efficiency, 123 YALE L.J. 2478
(2014).
28 See infra Section I.A (summarizing the economic theory).
29 See, e.g., Charles L. Ballard et al., General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal
Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 128, 135 (1985) (estimating that
for every marginal tax dollar collected, $0.17 to $0.56 is lost due to tax distortions and
other associated costs).
30 Natasha Sarin has taken a step in this direction by arguing empirically demonstrat-
ing types of intervention that can work in consumer finance. See Natasha Sarin, Making
Consumer Finance Work, 119 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3328607 (paying sustained attention to the potential of consumer financial pro-
tection to have a positive impact on consumer welfare if designed well).
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charge.31  As a result of consumer law’s magnitude, distributional impact,
and effectiveness, consumer law should be considered alongside tax law as a
distributional tool.32
In terms of more concrete policy reforms, a key barrier to stronger con-
sumer law is informational.  Open empirical questions remain about the level
of overcharge and its distribution within the firm and throughout the econ-
omy.  Precise answers to those questions depend on something that busi-
nesses closely guard: profit and salary data.33
Administrative agencies should remedy that informational impasse by
exercising what the Supreme Court has described as the fundamental “power
to get information from those who best can give it and who are most inter-
ested in not doing so.”34  As does the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
through mandatory tax filings, many regulators today have the legal authority
to collect better information about the consequences of consumer over-
charge.35  Given the indications of consumer overcharge’s importance, tak-
ing the next step of knowing more rests on strong intellectual grounds.
In the meantime, reformers and regulators regularly decide where to
invest resources.  In making those decisions, the inherent assumption is often
that consumer law is not a large-scale tool for redistribution and efficiency.
Yet that assumption is inconsistent with what is known.  At the very least, the
burden should be on those who would ignore consumer law or argue against
action to justify their position.  Additionally, at least in many significant mar-
kets, the working hypothesis should be that an increase in consumer law
enforcement would significantly reduce inequality while making those mar-
kets work better.  A broader conception of consumer law is needed, which
begins with analyzing the combined impact of antitrust, consumer protec-
tion, and entry barriers on consumer spending.  That expanded disciplinary
lens, and a greater focus on overcharge, will facilitate the most important
intellectual shift, toward integrating macroeconomic distributional founda-
tions for intervention.
The Article is structured around the three main overcharge questions
requiring better measurement.  Part I considers the magnitude of overcharge
by reviewing market-specific studies, ranging from financial products to
goods.  Part II looks at the data showing which socioeconomic groups pay
more overcharge in the marketplace, and which groups earn more income
after businesses take in those higher prices.  Part III considers the research
on whether legal interventions may reduce overcharge and examines the
political feasibility of consumer law action compared to tax increases.  Part IV
31 See infra Section III.A.
32 To be clear, the goal here is not to argue against tax reform, but instead to show
another option—consumer law—offers underappreciated practical and intellectual
promise.
33 See infra Section IV.A.
34 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950).
35 See infra Part IV.
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suggests the path forward, centered on regulatory monitoring of markets and
a more holistic vision of consumer law’s role in society.
I. THE MAGNITUDE OF OVERCHARGE
Legal scholars, political scientists, and economists have made numerous
estimates of overcharge, but these studies have necessarily focused on a par-
ticular market and remain disconnected across disciplines, such as antitrust,
contracts, and marketing.  This Part offers the first synthesis of those empiri-
cal studies in the legal literature, and the first scholarly treatment of them
aimed at obtaining a macro perspective on the total amount by which con-
sumers overpay.
A. The Theory: Behavioral and Informational Overcharge
In a perfectly competitive market, which assumes consumers are
informed and rational, any seller who charges higher prices without provid-
ing additional value for those higher prices would lose customers.36  The loss
of customers would either drive ineffective businesses out of the market, or
prompt the higher-priced seller to lower prices (or increase quality) to regain
customers.  In this sense, perfectly competitive markets can self-regulate.
Consumers demand low prices and quality goods.  As a result, to remain in
business, sellers must innovate, price competitively, and produce more prod-
ucts that people want.37  Although perfect competition is an analytic tool,
and not meant to describe real markets, it provides a guidepost for legal
interventions under the belief that society benefits when markets move closer
to it.38  This Article focuses on measurable, real-world overcharge, but in the-
ory the total overcharge is the difference between real-world prices and the
lower prices that consumers would pay if markets reflected perfect
competition.39
Perfect competition cannot exist without rational decisions, which can
be defined as those advancing consumers’ interests given the choices availa-
ble in the market.  In reality, behavioral economics research shows that con-
sumers instead often do not operate rationally when evaluating options.  For
example, many people of all educational levels rely on mental shortcuts, esti-
36 See, e.g., Bubb & Pildes, supra note 19, at 1602–03 (providing an overview of neoclas-
sical economic theory and the proper role of government intervention in a market con-
taining rational actors).
37 For an overview of these fundamental economic concepts, see N. GREGORY MANKIW,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 66–67 (6th ed. 2012).
38 See, e.g., Morgan Ricks, Money as Infrastructure, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 757, 838
(describing rate regulation as an instance of experts seeking to make markets “mimic the
pricing structure and efficient resource allocation that would prevail under perfect
competition”).
39 By this definition, the baseline is the absence of some measurable influence—such
as removing a business practice that currently causes consumers to pay more.  In this sense,
the focus here is different from those looking at surplus. See, e.g., Michael D. Guttentag,
Law and Surplus: Opportunities Missed, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 607 (2019).
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mate probabilities poorly, and exhibit overconfidence.40  Companies adapt
their sales and pricing practices to exploit such behavioral biases, because
doing so is profitable.41
Informed consumers are also necessary for perfect competition.  Per-
fectly rational consumers may continue to buy higher-priced, lower quality
products if they are unaware of better alternatives available.  As a result, sell-
ers that offer less value can persist in the marketplace.
Thus, from an economic perspective, insufficient information and irra-
tionality not only hurt consumers, but can also cause broader market failures.
Allowing inefficient sellers to survive can harm society, creating less wealth
and fewer products.  Many existing consumer protection laws, and many calls
for new regulation by legal scholars, aim to lessen information asymmetries
and behavioral biases, in part because this foundational economic theory
holds that markets function best, and society benefits most, when consumers
are informed and rational.42  As the Supreme Court has put it, “the unre-
strained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our
economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest
material progress.”43
B. The Evidence: Overcharge Related to Consumer Protection
This Section summarizes real-world evidence of overcharge rather than
laboratory studies.44  The goal in reviewing the literature is to identify all
40 See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1477 (1998).
41 See, e.g., Glenn Ellison & Alexander Wolitzky, A Search Cost Model of Obfuscation, 43
RAND J. ECON. 417, 417 (2012) (finding firms rationally make it more difficult for consum-
ers to ascertain price, as doing so increases profit); Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson,
Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121
Q.J. ECON. 505, 506–07 (2006) (offering a model for how firms profit from shifting costs to
less salient product features such as add-on printer cartridges).
42 See, BAR-GILL, supra note 5, at 6–9 (explaining how companies can strategically
make consumers pay more and noting reforms that may address these practices); Joshua D.
Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at War with Each Other, 121
YALE L.J. 2216, 2220 (2012)  (“[The] Dodd-Frank [Act] . . . represents the arrival of behav-
ioral law and economics as the intellectual centerpiece of the current administration’s
approach.”).
43 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
44 Laboratory research supports those field studies by examining how people respond
given a set of choices and hypothetical money to spend, and indeed often indicates even
higher magnitudes of overcharge.  For instance, in two laboratory studies, researchers
caused participants to be willing to pay 21% to over 100% more on clothing and electron-
ics by showing them a high anchor price, such as a newspaper clipping with a high num-
ber. See Rashmi Adaval & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Conscious and Nonconscious Comparisons with
Price Anchors: Effects on Willingness to Pay for Related and Unrelated Products, 48 J. MARKETING
RES. 355, 357–61 (2011) (concluding that showing advertisements with high anchors to
subjects can increase their valuations on a range of clothing and electronics items by 20%
or more).  But that evidence is less persuasive because it is always possible that people act
differently when spending real money in a complex world. See Alan Schwartz, Regulating
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studies that rigorously estimate consumer overcharge.45  However, even the
most rigorous overcharge studies inevitably have limitations.  As is true for
much of applied economics, studies of overcharge rely heavily on assump-
tions about the structure of an individual market.46  The complex nature of
any sizeable market makes it impossible to obtain definitive numerical esti-
mates of overcharge—especially when the researchers lacked access to inter-
nal business data that is rarely shared publicly.47  Nor is the underlying
economic theory definitively established, as “fundamental questions on the
relevance of market power are underanalyzed, if examined at all.”48  Scholars
are still developing behavioral economics models as well.49  Nonetheless, the
academic consensus is that economics can produce meaningful insight into
market dynamics such as real-world overcharge, rather than simply unverifi-
able theories.50
for Rationality, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1379 (2015) (“[C]onsumers in markets may not make
the same mistakes the experimental subjects make because many biases moderate or van-
ish with experience.”).
45 The discussion also focuses on studies quantifying the average additional amount
paid—rather than simply showing that consumers make mistakes.  Space constraints do
not permit a full review of the vast literature about consumer behavior that does not quan-
tify the impact—although that literature would only make the case stronger for pervasive
overcharge. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 5, at 33–46 (reviewing the empirical
data in consumer finance that consumers act irrationally); Michael D. Grubb, Failing to
Choose the Best Price: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 47 REV. INDUS. ORG. 303, 310–13 (2015)
(surveying evidence across markets of consumer mistakes).
46 See Sanjib Bhuyan & Rigoberto A. Lopez, Oligopoly Power and Allocative Efficiency in US
Food and Tobacco Industries, 49 J. AGRIC. ECON. 434, 435 (1998) (observing that “welfare
losses are critically determined by assumptions about the modes of conduct, marginal
costs, and demand elasticities” but suggesting that the “‘new empirical industrial organisa-
tion’ (NEIO) approach” approach aids in “avoid[ing] biases introduced by [these]
assumptions”).
47 Asher Schechter, The Rise of Market Power and the Decline of Labor’s Share, PROMARKET
(Aug. 14, 2017), https://promarket.org/rise-market-power-decline-labors-share/ (observ-
ing that estimating companies’ markups is “notoriously difficult due to the scarcity of data”
while reporting the views expressed in an interview of economists Jan De Loecker and Jan
Eeckhout).  Antitrust-related overcharge estimates face similar challenges.  For mergers
economists often use a difference-in-differences methodology to compare prices in con-
trol-group markets unaffected by the merger to prices—before and after—in markets
affected by the merger to determine whether margins have increased anticompetitively,
rather than relying on businesses’ actual cost and price data. See John Simpson & David
Schmidt, Difference-in-Differences Analysis in Antitrust: A Cautionary Note, 75 ANTITRUST L.J.
623, 624 (2008) (discussing assumptions underlying difference-in-differences estimations).
This requires locating a similar control group, such as a different geography or stores’ own
brands, presumed to be unaffected by the merger. See id.
48 Louis Kaplow, On the Relevance of Market Power, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1304 (2017);
see also David A. Hoffman & Michael P. O’Shea, Can Law and Economics Be Both Practical and
Principled?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 338 (2002).
49 See, e.g., Gregory Klass & Kathryn Zeiler, Against Endowment Theory: Experimental Eco-
nomics and Legal Scholarship, 61 UCLA L. REV. 2 (2013).
50 Despite lacking access to firms’ internal margins, these “outside-in” studies have
been published in the leading peer-reviewed economic journals and inform real-world,
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To minimize omissions, the studies below were traced forward on
Google Scholar in search of any subsequent contradictory empirical findings.
Of course, it is possible that journals and scholars are biased towards studies
demonstrating overcharge.51  The use of Google Scholar helps identify even
unpublished studies, which are regularly listed online.  This methodology
means that the studies most likely to be missed are those in markets omitted
from the estimates below—because authors may view their new studies as
relevant only to those markets rather than overcharge in general, thus caus-
ing the papers to lack citations to overcharge studies in other fields.52
Another explanation for the lack of studies in some markets is the difficulty
in obtaining data.53  Given the possibility of overcharge studies in omitted
markets, the review below suggests a lower bound, as many markets not men-
tioned presumably also have overcharge.
The real-world evidence of overcharge has varied greatly by market.
Research on Medicare spending illustrates how complex financial products
like insurance contribute to overcharge.  Medicare spending data, unlike that
of most other industries, is publicly available, thus rendering decisionmaking
unusually visible.  Medicare recipients have a choice among over forty pre-
scription plans offered by private insurers.  Some plans have higher monthly
payments, and others higher deductibles.  Two field studies have found that
Medicare recipients pay about 30% more for prescriptions on average
because they do not choose the best available drug plan.54
high-stakes analyses by the world’s largest companies about whether a market is profitable
enough to enter.  Leemore Dafny et al., Paying a Premium on Your Premium? Consolidation in
the US Health Insurance Industry, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 1161, 1162, 1164 (2012) (discussing
how “adequate data” presents a challenge to establishing a link between health insurance
consolidation and premiums because such data is “considered highly confidential,” but
utilizing data from the Large Employer Health Insurance Dataset, a “leading benefits con-
sulting firm”).
51 This bias would reflect the preference for establishing something new or significant
rather than disproving or minimizing something already done.
52 This is the most likely category of omission because most studies of overcharge in
one of the markets mentioned below would presumably cite or be cited by prior studies of
that same market.
53 Schechter, supra note 47 (reporting the perspective of economists Jan De Loecker
and Jan Eeckhout).  Even if all data were available, academics have limited interest in repli-
cating the same insight across similar markets—since the resulting insights would lack nov-
elty. See Harold Pashler & Eric-Jan Wagenmakers, Editors’ Introduction to the Special Section on
Replicability in Psychological Science: A Crisis of Confidence?, 7 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 528, 528
(2012) (providing overview of the replicability “crisis” in empirical scholarship).
54 Jason Abaluck & Jonathan Gruber, Choice Inconsistencies Among the Elderly: Evidence
from Plan Choice in the Medicare Part D Program, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 1180, 1189–92 (2011)
(concluding that better plan choices could save individuals 30.9% of the $1711 in prescrip-
tion costs spent on premiums and out-of-pocket costs, without the difference being
explainable by plan quality); Jeffrey R. Kling et al., Comparison Friction: Experimental Evidence
from Medicare Drug Plans, 127 Q.J. ECON. 199, 201, 215 (2012) (finding consumers could
have saved 30% overall by switching to the optimal prescription drug plan available, and
that providing better information on plans overall saved consumers 5%).
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Medicare patients are not representative of the broader population,
since they are elderly.55  But research indicates widespread difficulty in
selecting optimal health, auto, and home insurance plans among all adults.56
The challenge of predicting future scenarios; estimating deductibles,
monthly payments, and copays; and other related search difficulties add hun-
dreds, if not thousands, of dollars in costs to individuals per year.57
Research into financial products outside of insurance has reached simi-
lar conclusions.  Credit card companies have become adept at capitalizing on
consumers’ psychological limitations.  This is one main reason why, for
instance, credit card companies offer teaser rates.  They know that most con-
sumers will sign up with the intent to switch in six months after the 0% inter-
est rate increases to 15%, but the vast majority will not do so—even if they are
paying the 15% rate on a balance.58  People are also overconfident in their
ability to avoid late fees, and thus are more inclined to ignore such fees in
choosing a credit card.59  Researchers estimate that credit card companies
overall charge interest rates 37% above competitive market levels by capitaliz-
ing on such behavioral shortcomings.60  The evidence suggests that the deci-
55 See Kling et al., supra note 54, at 201 (estimating that the study’s “sample [consisting
of seniors] had larger potential savings in dollars . . . from switching to the lowest-cost plan
than a national sample would have had”).  Also, the baseline for that 30% overcharge is
optimal choice of plans by everyone, which is unrealistic since it would mean everyone has
made a perfect decision.
56 See Randall D. Cebul et al., Unhealthy Insurance Markets: Search Frictions and the Cost
and Quality of Health Insurance, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 1842, 1842–44, 1868 (2011) (finding
that search frictions alone transferred $34 billion of consumer surplus to health insurers
annually in 1997, which adjusted for inflation would amount to $54 billion in 2018); Elisa-
beth Honka, Quantifying Search and Switching Costs in the US Auto Insurance Industry, 45
RAND J. ECON. 847, 870 (2014) (calculating that eliminating auto-insurance search costs
increases consumer welfare by $859 per person or 158% of the annual premium paid); see
also Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, 7 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 35, 46–47 (1993) (finding in laboratory settings a 23% difference in payment
for car insurance depending on whether the right to sue was framed as a default); Kangoh
Lee, Consumer Perception, Information Provision, and Regulation of Insurance Markets, 51 J. REG.
ECON. 1, 2 (2017) (finding that home owners pay $100 more in insurance premiums for a
lower deductible that is only worth $25); Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Under-
standing the Lack of Transparency in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394,
396–97 (2014) (describing the effects of a lack of regulations promoting transparent insur-
ance markets).
57 See Abaluck & Gruber, supra note 54; Kling et al., supra note 54.
58 See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The CARD Act and Beyond, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 967, 967 (2012) (concluding that “regulators should . . . consider limiting
the ability of issuers to charge introductory teaser interest rates that are, in a sense, ‘too
low’”).
59 See e.g., Wright, supra note 42, at 2248–49.
60 See Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 AM.
ECON. REV. 50, 73 (1991) (using data from 1983 to 1988).
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sion architecture, and resulting overcharge, is also high in bank accounts,61
mortgages,62 and payday loans.63
Insurance and financial products are particularly susceptible to over-
charge because those products are inherently more complex.  Complexity
means consumers must process more information to understand the product
and its full price.  Sellers can increase decision-making complexity with long,
densely worded contracts and pricing packages that require many algebraic
calculations and accurate estimations to know how much a product will cost
when all fees and usage charges are summed.64  This complexity causes con-
sumers to rely even more on simplification strategies, increasing the likeli-
hood of suboptimal decisions.65
Research on cellphone services shows that products less complex than
finance are open to overcharge.  Oren Bar-Gill and Rebecca Stone have
found that choosing the optimal cellphone plan among the various bundles
available requires an algebraic analysis of each plan’s data allocations, over-
age fees, and teaser rates.66  Such an analysis would also ideally need to make
accurate predictions about the likelihood of future switching and usage,
based on an individual’s past behavior.  Bar-Gill and Stone conclude that
cellphone companies strategically add complexity to their pricing packages
to profit from such consumer confusion.67  With access to one cellphone car-
61 Willis, supra note 20, at 1177–78 (reporting consumers paid $20 billion on overdraft
fees in 2009 and explaining the strategic behavior financial institutions engage in to obtain
them); Darrell Duffie & Arvind Krishnamurthy, Passthrough Efficiency in the Fed’s New
Monetary Policy Setting 5 (2016) (paper presented at the 2016 Jackson Hole Symposium of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/
publication-pdf/jh-september-8-2016-bw.pdf (showing how banks exploit depositors’ costs
of search, monitoring, and attention to avoid passing through increases in Federal Reserve
rates).
62 Susan E. Woodward & Robert E. Hall, Consumer Confusion in the Mortgage Market:
Evidence of Less Than a Perfectly Transparent and Competitive Market, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 511,
515 (2010) (finding “[e]xcessive charges resulting from some borrowers’ poor understand-
ing of the mortgage market” and concluding that the market’s exploitation of the “poorest
and most confused” lenders is “inefficient” and results in “pure social loss”); Alexei Alexan-
drov & Sergei Koulayev, No Shopping in the U.S. Mortgage Market: Direct and Strategic Effects of
Providing Information 2 (Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau Office of Research, Working Paper
No. 2017-01, 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2948491 (estimating the average consumer
would save $300 per year by choosing the best mortgage quote, for a total of $13 billion
annually in lost savings).
63 See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Adair Morse, Information Disclosure, Cognitive Biases,
and Payday Borrowing, 66 J. FIN. 1865, 1865 (2011) (reducing payday borrowing by 11%
through disclosures in a field experiment); Ronald Mann, Assessing the Optimism of Payday
Loan Borrowers, 21 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 105, 123 (2013) (finding that “43 percent [of payday
loan borrowers] failed to clear themselves from debt within two weeks of their predicted
date”).
64 See BAR-GILL, supra note 5, at 18–19.
65 See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 40, at 1477.
66 For a review of the theory and empirics, see, for example, Grubb, supra note 45, at
310–12.
67 See Bar-Gill & Stone, supra note 9, at 453.
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rier’s data, they determined that the average cost to consumers from select-
ing the wrong plan was an 8% increase in prices paid.68
The literature has also quantified behavioral overcharge resulting from
strategically complex pricing in even more seemingly straightforward con-
texts.  In retail gasoline, economists have estimated that if consumers had
better information about prices within a one-mile radius, they could save
about 5% nationwide each year.69  Manufacturers of certain goods, such as
televisions and mattresses, use different names, bar codes, or specifications to
make the comparison of products across stores impractical.70  Others price
the base product (e.g., a printer) low and shift costs to less visible add-on
items or replacement parts (e.g., printer ink, electric toothbrush heads, or
shaver blades).71  Some of these shifted add-on prices are competed away
through lower base product prices, and some cross-price subsidization may
occur across consumers, but economic research shows that such add-on pric-
ing practices ultimately lead to a higher overall price and profit equilib-
rium.72  In a separate strategy that is usually illegal, but still pervasive,
retailers offer “fictitious” prices by initially listing inflated higher prices for a
few days so they can later put items on sale so that the buyer assumes the
“sale” price is low.73  Thus, the literature suggests that markets for even seem-
ingly “simple” consumer goods exhibit signs of overcharge due to companies’
strategic manipulation of consumers’ behavioral limitations.
Although these practices are widespread, academics have quantified the
overcharge in only a fraction of goods markets.  One of the most rigorous
studies available in any market, goods or otherwise, by Glenn and Sara Elli-
son, looked at the online sale of essentially identical computer accessories.74
The study is unusual because the authors had access to internal firm data
about costs and margins.  The data indicated that sellers were able to “obfus-
cate,” or add decision-making complexity, through practices like lengthier
descriptions or high shipping fees amounting often to as much as the price
68 Id.
69 See Ambarish Chandra & Mariano Tappata, Consumer Search and Dynamic Price Disper-
sion: An Application to Gasoline Markets, 42 RAND J. ECON. 681, 700 (2011) (estimating con-
sumers could save 5% on gasoline by searching within a one-mile radius); see also Federico
Rossi & Pradeep K. Chintagunta, Price Transparency and Retail Prices: Evidence from Fuel Price
Signs in the Italian Highway System, 53 J. MARKETING RES. 407, 409 (2016) (finding that Ital-
ian consumers paid more as a result of a lack of transparency).
70 See Glenn Ellison, Bounded Rationality in Industrial Organization, in 2 ADVANCES IN
ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, NINTH WORLD CONGRESS 142,
157–59 (Richard Blundell et al. eds., 2006); Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 41, at 506.
71 Ellison, supra note 70, at 159; Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 41, at 506.
72 See Ellison, supra note 70, at 159–60.
73 See David Adam Friedman, Reconsidering Fictitious Pricing, 100 MINN. L. REV. 921,
922–23 (2016).
74 See Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on the
Internet, 77 ECONOMETRICA 427 (2009).
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of the product itself.75  They estimate that such practices allowed the firms to
earn 6% to 9% more than otherwise would be expected.76
When goods add additional complexity to the decision, those margins
could be higher.  As a start, the comparison of a large basket of goods across
many stores—or the comparison of multiple lists of hundreds of search
results from online sellers—makes it difficult to know which supermarkets or
mass retailers offer the overall best deal.77  Even individual items, however,
can pose challenges.  Consumers overestimate the likelihood of electronics
breakdowns, making them more willing to pay more for warranties.  Jose
Miguel Abito and Yuval Salant conclude that such overestimation accounts
for 37% of the price of extended warranties.78  Brands can also influence
consumer decisions.  If consumers pay more for a brand due to emotional
attachment to the logo, or perhaps even a desire to save time shopping, it
would not necessarily be a market failure because consumers could arguably
be advancing their interests with those decisions.  In one study of headache
remedies, however, the authors found that nonexperts bought the brand-
name product, such as Bayer, at a far higher rate than experts, such as phar-
macists and doctors, did.79  Prices would decline an estimated 15% overall if
75 See id. at 428 (examining the effects that search obfuscation tactics have on consum-
ers of internet retail goods).
76 See id. at 428–29 (concluding that the average markup on the products in the study
was 12%, and the estimated equilibrium price-cost margins were between 3% and 6%).
77 See Mark Aguiar & Erik Hurst, Life-Cycle Prices and Production, 97 AM. ECON. REV.
1533, 1533 (2007) (finding 7%–10% savings by shopping more frequently); James Binkley,
Prices Paid in Grocery Markets: Searching Across Stores and Brands, 47 J. CONSUMER AFF. 465, 466
(2013) (reviewing the literature finding considerable savings from comparison shopping);
id. at 480 (finding in an empirical study that even simple within-store comparisons can save
10%); Michael Dinerstein et al., Consumer Price Search and Platform Design in Internet Com-
merce, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 1820, 1821 (2018) (using internal data to conclude that eBay
could lower consumer prices by 5%–15% simply by improving its search algorithm).  Addi-
tionally, such practices have been observed throughout online and offline retail, but some
believe the resulting margins are higher offline. See Erik Brynjolfsson & Michael D. Smith,
Frictionless Commerce? A Comparison of Internet and Conventional Retailers, 46 MGMT. SCI. 563,
563 (2000) (“We find that prices on the Internet are 9–16% lower than prices in conven-
tional outlets . . . .”); David J. DiRusso, The Prevalence of Product Obfuscation and Bait and
Switch Tactics in Online Shopping, 4 INT’L J. ECON. COM. & MGMT. 1, 2 (2016).  It should be
noted that these estimates also leave out some potential further areas of overcharge, such
as deceptive advertising. See Anita Rao & Emily Wang, Demand for “Healthy” Products: False
Claims and FTC Regulation, 54 J. MARKETING RES. 968 (2017) (documenting demand impact
of false advertising); Jonathan Zinman & Eric Zitzewitz, Wintertime for Deceptive Advertising?,
8 AM. ECON. J. 177, 177 (2016) (“Casual empiricism suggests that deceptive advertising
about product quality is prevalent . . . .”).
78 Jose Miguel Abito & Yuval Salant, On the Relevance of Probability Distortions in the
Extended Warranties Market 1 (Oct. 14, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.e
con.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/ABITO.Relevance%20of%20Probability%20Distortions.
pdf (estimating that retailers’ margins are about 46% of the price of the warranty, and that
probability distortions account for 80% of profit).
79 See Bart J. Bronnenberg et al., Do Pharmacists Buy Bayer? Informed Shoppers and the
Brand Premium, 130 Q.J. ECON. 1669, 1669 (2015).
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nonexpert consumers were to adopt the buying practices of pharmacists, who
are far more likely to buy the generic brand.80  The authors conclude that
many headache-relief choices result from brand-value misperception, since
the products are chemically identical and experts make different choices.81
The evidence thus indicates that overcharge is significant across many
markets.  Consumers pay more as a result of companies’ complex pricing
strategies, which exploit consumers’ decision-making limitations.  However,
even when synthesized, these studies do not immediately provide an aggre-
gate figure for overcharge.
C. Summing Consumer Overcharge
Moving toward an economy-wide perspective on consumer law would
require translating the above studies into a total dollar amount across the
economy and adding that quantity to antitrust-related overcharge.  Decades
ago, scholars studied monopoly overcharge on an economy-wide basis.82  But
market-specific studies are now understood as adding valuable precision,
since market dynamics vary so greatly by product.83  A figure for total over-
charge would thus ideally reflect industry-specific studies.
One challenge with obtaining an aggregate figure is how to handle the
many markets that scholars have yet to quantify directly.  To obtain an aggre-
gate figure despite only a subset of markets studied, it would be necessary to
assume either that unstudied markets have no overcharge or that unstudied
markets exhibit similar levels of overcharge as related markets. Each of those
paths has flaws.
Using studied markets to extrapolate to related unstudied markets is
necessarily speculative.  Indeed, even obtaining a market-specific figure
80 See id. at 1684, 1698, 1699 tbl.3 (2015) (estimating that consumers would save 22%
on average by moving to store-brand alternatives across 240 categories of food, drink, and
health items); Grubb, supra note 45, at 309 (noting that Bronnenberg et al. estimate that
overall consumer expenditures would fall by 15% if all consumers behaved like
pharmacists).
81 See Bronnenberg et al., supra note 79, at 1669.
82 See, e.g., William S. Comanor & Robert H. Smiley, Monopoly and the Distribution of
Wealth, 89 Q.J. ECON. 177, 180 (1975) (providing aggregate figures for monopoly over-
charge across the economy); Irene Powell, The Effect of Reductions in Concentration on Income
Distribution, 69 REV. ECON. & STAT. 75, 75, 81 (1987) (examining the manufacturing sector
and concluding that market concentration likely made only a minor contribution to
income inequality).  Powell’s study ignored overcharge related to consumer protection in
general, and behavioral economics in particular.
83 See BAR-GILL, supra note 5, at 249 (“[T]o fully understand the dynamics of contract
design and the potential role of legal intervention, a market-specific analysis is required.”);
Richard J. Sexton & Nathalie Lavoie, Food Processing and Distribution: An Industrial Organiza-
tion Approach, in 1 HANDBOOK OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 863, 912–13 (Bruce L. Gardner
& Gordon C. Rausser eds., 2001) (noting that early aggregate studies of monopoly pricing
were appropriately criticized on many levels, most importantly because they inferred mar-
ket power from accounting data and made broad assumptions about pricing behavior
across many different markets).
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already involves extrapolation.  For example, Oren Bar-Gill and Rebecca
Stone conclude that if their 8% overcharge figure for cellphone plans at a
single carrier were extrapolated “onto the entire U.S. population of cell
phone users,” it would amount to about $12 billion annually in lower con-
sumer surplus.84  An assumption that cable or internet pricing produces simi-
lar results would be unreliable because even related markets exhibit some
unique dynamics.
However, the alternative of assuming that unstudied markets have no
behavioral overcharge is unrealistic because the firms in unstudied industries
pervasively adopt pricing strategies established elsewhere as leading to over-
charge.  For instance, airlines and hotels shift the overall price paid to less
salient fees for baggage check, internet access, and on-site parking.85  Com-
cast and Time Warner offer complex options with various teaser rates and
multidimensional pricing depending on internet speed, number of television
channels, and so on.86  The more plausible inference would thus be that
those similar pricing strategies produce some level of overcharge in these
unstudied industries, as predicted by economic theory overall, and as shown
empirically in related industries.
The challenge then becomes how to obtain even a rough sense of the
magnitude, which is valuable for forming a preliminary perspective on
whether behavioral overcharge is worth investing scarce academic and gov-
ernment resources.  One approach comes from antitrust, even though most
antitrust scholars avoid quantifying the aggregate overcharge in a given
industry.87  In surveying empirical studies of the effect of mergers on prices,
Lina Khan and Sandeep Vaheesan have used an extrapolation methodology
to conclude that “[t]he aggregate wealth transfer effect from pervasive
monopoly and oligopoly power is likely, at a minimum, hundreds of billions
of dollars per year.” 88  They reach this number by looking at studies of indi-
vidual mergers in subindustries and then providing the various amounts of
antitrust-related overcharge that would result at different levels of assumed
overcharge, such as 5%–25%.89
Extrapolations based on behavioral overcharge adds up quickly if over-
charge percentages are assumed to reflect existing subindustry studies.  Con-
sumer finance and insurance alone amount to over $2 trillion in
84 Oren Bar-Gill & Rebecca Stone, Mobile Misperceptions, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49,
96–97 (2009).
85 See, e.g., Grubb, supra note 45 (reviewing the literature on pricing effects); Van Loo,
supra note 5 (showing the pervasiveness of behavioral pricing strategies in goods markets).
86 See, e.g., Alina Tugend, All-in-One Telecom Packages: The Savings Don’t Come Simple,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2008, at C1 (explaining telecom pricing structures).
87 Most legal scholars asserting a large connection between antitrust and inequality do
not quantify the effect, in part because most of the studies are of individual mergers (a
more micro-level analysis) rather than of entire industries. See, e.g., Baker & Salop Kleiner
et al., supra note 16.
88 See Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 22, at 236.
89 Id. at 246–50, 246 tbl. 1.
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expenditures annually.90  The estimated overcharge percentages in con-
sumer finance ranged across industries and included 37% in credit cards and
30% in Medicare insurance selection.91  Adopting a range of 20%–35%
would amount to between $400 billion and $700 billion in overcharge for
finance and insurance.92  Assuming a 5%–10% range to cover the 6%–9%
overcharge for retail goods from the most rigorous study in that sector, by
Ellison and Ellison, would add $172–$286 billion in overcharge annually.93
Assuming that gasoline and related energy goods incur 5% overcharge, and
telecommunications pricing practices add 5%–10%, would add another
$27–$39 billion annually.94  Overcharge extrapolations from these industries
would, depending on the assumed percentage, produce an aggregate figure
ranging from $599 billion to $1.025 trillion.
These four industries amount to only a fraction of consumer spending,
leaving about $9 trillion in consumer spending yet to be considered, in cate-
gories ranging from motor vehicles to gym memberships.95  Moving toward a
figure for these other sectors would require more speculative assumptions.
But if it turned out those other sectors had a 5%–10% level of overcharge, it
would add another $443–$887 billion, putting the aggregate extrapolated
overcharge at between a trillion and almost two trillion dollars.96
The actual figure could be higher or lower.  Some sectors of consumer
spending may have negligible overcharge, such as the highly competitive res-
90 Consumer spending on financial and insurance products totals about $2.6 trillion
annually. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES
2017 HIGHLIGHTS 2 (2017), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/
Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/highlights.pdf
(estimating private health insurance premiums as $1.1 trillion in 2016); Facts + Statistics:
Industry Overview, INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-industry-
overview (last visited Aug. 28, 2019) (estimating property and casualty insurance spending
as $558 billion annually); Table 2.1, supra note 14 (listing interest payments as $299 billion
annually); Table 2.4.5. Personal Consumption Expenditures by Major Type of Product, BUREAU
ECON. ANALYSIS, https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=19&step=2#reqid=19&
step=2&isuri=1&1921=survey (open “Section 2-Personal Income and Outlays” menu; then
follow hyperlink to Table 2.4.5) (last updated Sept. 26, 2019) [hereinafter Table 2.4.5]
(listing financial services spending as $661 billion annually).  These figures sum to $2618
billion.
91 See supra notes 54–60 and accompanying text.
92 Calculated as 0.2 * $2 trillion= $400 billion, and 0.35 * $2 trillion = $700 billion.
93 See Table 2.4.5, supra note 90 (listing consumer expenditures as totaling $2.86 tril-
lion in 2017 for food purchased for home consumption, furnishings and durable house-
hold equipment, recreational goods, other durable goods, clothing and footwear, and
other nondurable goods excluding pharmaceuticals).  Calculated as 0.06 * $2.86 trillion.
94 See Table 2.4.5, supra note 90 (putting gasoline and other energy products at $308
billion in 2017, and communication services at $236 billion).  Calculated as 0.05 * $308
billion = $15 billion; 0.05 * $236 billion = $12 billion; and 0.1 * $236 billion = $24 billion.
95 See id. (providing breakdowns for consumer spending).
96 This figure is reached by adding 5% of $10 trillion (which amounts to $500 billion)
to the figures mentioned above for retail goods and finance, of $400 billion in overcharge
for finance and insurance, and between $172 billion and $257 billion in overcharge
annually.
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taurant industry.  Others could have significantly more than the assumed
amounts, such as telecommunications.  Also, the level of overcharge in a
given industry will fluctuate over time.  There are signs that in recent decades
business markup of profits (above costs) has increased, and one explanation
for that trend is overcharge.97
It is also worth noting that many limitations in the existing literature
lead to underestimations of consumer overcharge.  Returning to the case of
cellphone-plan choices, the actual decision facing consumers is more com-
plex than the one Bar-Gill and Stone quantified.  To find the best deal, con-
sumers must choose among the plans offered by various carriers, not simply
by one carrier.  As a result, the actual overcharge may be significantly more
than what Bar-Gill and Stone found if, for instance, T-Mobile offers lower-
priced plans for comparable quality than the carrier they studied.  Without
industry-wide data, overcharge estimates may not fully capture the level of
complexity faced by consumers and thus may underestimate the magnitude
of overcharge.
To expand the concept of consumer law overcharge even further, legal
interventions that could reduce anticompetitive prices go beyond mergers
and consumer protection, and include many laws that provide entry barriers
or related limits.  For instance, about 25% of occupations are protected by
state licensing laws, ranging from hair stylists to doctors, and the number is
growing rapidly.98  Although some licensing benefits consumers, economists’
rough estimate of the aggregate impact of licensing restrictions is that they
raise consumer prices by 15%, or over $226 billion annually,99 a figure
described by Aaron Edlin and Rebecca Haw Allensworth as
“[c]onservative.”100  Consumers may pay hundreds of billions of dollars more
from real estate zoning, excess intellectual property, state-granted territory
monopolies to auto dealers, and various other forms of governmental
overcharge.101
97 See Susanto Basu, Are Price-Cost Markups Rising in the United States? A Discussion of the
Evidence, 33 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3 (2019) (reviewing the market-level studies suggesting
rising markups and raising questions based in part on macroeconomic factors).
98 See Morris M. Kleiner & Evgeny Vorotnikov, Analyzing Occupational Licensing Among
the States, 52 J. REG. ECON. 132, 134 (2017).
99 See Morris M. Kleiner, Occupational Licensing: Protecting the Public Interest or Protection-
ism? 2–3 (W.E. Upjohn Inst. Emp’t Research, Policy Paper No. 2011-009, 2011), http://
research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=UP_policypapers (figure
adjusted for inflation to 2018 dollars).
100 Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face
Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1102 (2014) (describing the Kleiner and Krue-
ger estimates as “[c]onservative”).
101 See Rory Van Loo, Consumer Law and Inequality (Mar. 15, 2016) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Yale Law School) (on file with author) (summarizing estimates of gov-
ernment overcharge, including from tariffs and price minimums); see also Daniel A. Crane,
Tesla and the Car Dealers’ Lobby, REGULATION, Summer 2014, at 10, 12–14 (discussing car
dealerships).
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In summary, considerable limitations in access to private business data
prevent strong conclusions about the level of overcharge in large portions of
the economy.  But the preliminary empirical literature available indicates
that the total consumer-protection-related overcharge across the economy is
large scale.  That conclusion is appropriate even if overcharge is assumed to
exist only in the few sectors studied, in which hundreds of billions of dollars
in overcharge may exist annually.  The existence of similar pricing practices
in other sectors that have yet to be quantified means that the total could be
considerably more.  Consumer protection laws that reduced overcharge
would thus constitute a micro-level legal intervention relevant to
macroeconomic conversations, since they give consumers potentially tremen-
dous savings.102  Assuming scholars are correct that antitrust and entry barri-
ers have similarly large effects, the case becomes even stronger that
macroeconomic policymakers should consider consumer laws more closely.
II. THE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF OVERCHARGE
Academics broadly support policies that make markets more efficient.103
For this reason alone, the magnitude of overcharge implicated by the previ-
ous section would prove attractive to those seeking to create new regulations,
remove anticompetitive laws, or enforce existing rules.  Given widespread
concerns about economic inequality, a meaningful link between overcharge
and inequality should elevate consumer law further.  This Part reviews the
evidence on whether reducing overcharge would lessen inequality.  Over-
charge can influence distribution in terms of both what consumers spend
and what they earn.
A. Spending on Overcharge
One way to think about how reducing overcharge affects consumers’
spending is as a discount coupon that is good everywhere overcharge exists.
For a household taking home and spending $100,000 annually, a reduction
of 10% overcharge across all that the household spends would amount to
getting $10,000 worth of discounts throughout the year.  That would be good
news for all consumers, but from an inequality standpoint it raises the ques-
tion of whether some households would get a larger discount on their spend-
ing.  Assuming that the reduction in overcharge were applied “need blind,”
102 See infra Section IV.B (discussing macroeconomic implications).
103 See, e.g., MANKIW, supra note 37, at 11–13 (illustrating the important role in eco-
nomic theory that regulation plays in well-functioning markets); ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL.,
TRADE REGULATION 2 (6th ed. 2010) (“[T]here is . . . a widely shared view that private
interests operating in free markets, and unchecked by effective government antitrust rules,
will harm efficiency and consumer welfare”); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in
Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
630, 631 (1979) (concluding that the strongest justification for regulation exists when
“imperfect information has produced noncompetitive prices and terms”); Barry C. Lynn,
Killing the Competition, HARPER’S MAG., Feb. 2012, at 27, 32 (discussing the broad support
for efficiency-improving laws).
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in other words without seeking to prioritize any particular group, low- and
middle-income consumers could still benefit more if they pay more than
their share of overcharge.  In other words, middle-income consumers might
save 15% of all they spend while wealthy consumers save 5%.
Surprisingly few studies answer the question of who pays more over-
charge—a narrower and more nuanced question than whether “the poor pay
more” overall.104  And sellers in most industries do not collect salary informa-
tion directly from their customers.  The main exception is in consumer
finance, partly because financial institutions check salary to determine
creditworthiness.  Researchers in this industry have consistently found that
wealthier and more educated consumers are better able to avoid over-
charge.105  Moreover, the consequences of this difference may be large.
Those without a college education pay an average of $1000 more in mort-
gage broker fees.106  And consumer protection on credit cards has dispropor-
tionately benefited borrowers with low credit scores in terms of deceptive
fees, from which it can be inferred that those with low credit scores pay a
disproportionate amount of such fees.107  Since behavioral overcharge on
financial products is one of the largest single categories of overcharge that
has been rigorously quantified,108 the fact that lower-income consumers sys-
tematically pay considerably more for financial products alone indicates at
least one substantial lever for behavioral overcharge influencing inequality.
Outside of finance, the evidence is less comprehensive.  Jerry A. Haus-
man and J. Gregory Sidak concluded that “the poor and less educated” pay
higher overcharge for long-distance phone calls in part because they are
more susceptible to predatory practices.109  In their study of cellphone
choices, Bar-Gill and Stone did not have access to customers’ salaries.  None-
theless, they found that a subset of consumers disproportionately paid more.
104 DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE (1963).
105 See, e.g., MICHAEL S. BARR, NO SLACK 8 (2012); Sumit Agarwal et al., Regulating Con-
sumer Financial Products: Evidence from Credit Cards, 130 Q.J. ECON. 111, 112 (2015); Bar-Gill
& Warren, supra note 5, at 64–69; Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Social Costs of Credit Card
Merchant Restraints, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 1 (2008) (“This Article demonstrates empiri-
cally that credit card rewards programs are funded in part by a highly regressive, sub rosa
subsidization of affluent credit consumers by poor cash consumers.”); Willis, supra note 20,
at 1178.
106 See Woodward & Hall, supra note 62, at 513.
107 See Agarwal et al., supra note 105, at 111 (estimating that following CARD Act regu-
lation consumers with FICO scores below 660 saved 5.3% of borrowing costs compared to
average savings of 1.6% for those with higher credit scores); Scott T. Nelson, Private Infor-
mation and Price Regulation in the US Credit Card Market (July 2019) (unpublished man-
uscript), https://economics.mit.edu/files/14225.
108 See supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text.
109 Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Why Do the Poor and the Less-Educated Pay More
for Long-Distance Calls?, 3 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, no. 1, art. 3, 2004, at
2 (concluding low-income and less educated consumers pay more than affluent and better
educated consumers for long-distance phone calls due to anticompetitive factors, either
from susceptibility to predatory practices or greater geographic exposure to monopoly
power).
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Although the overall average price increase was 8%, an estimated 42,500,000
Americans paid 20% more monthly on their cellphone bills as a result of
choosing the wrong plan.110  The authors concluded the disproportionate
burden of mistaken choices indicates “a potentially troubling form of regres-
sive redistribution.”111
What is known about this subset of consumers who are particularly sus-
ceptible to overcharge beyond finance?  In their seminal piece showing that
manufacturers shift much of the costs of printers to the more hidden price of
ink cartridges, Gabaix and Laibson conclude that less “sophisticated” con-
sumers are particularly susceptible.112  One field study looked at the likeli-
hood that consumers would switch insurance plans upon searching for
information and concluded that “higher educated people use available
health plan information more effectively than lower educated people.”113
Scholars researching gender and racial disparities in consumer law have
produced indirect evidence of regressive overcharge.  In one field experi-
ment, women who called an auto repair shop for work on a car received
higher price quotes for describing the same exact work needed.114  Another
field experiment showed how car dealers attempt to overcharge African
Americans and women for buying new cars, and informal interviews suggest
that dealers target uninformed consumers who are disproportionately lower
income and less educated.115  Charging women and African Americans more
on average will have regressive effects, because those groups earn less on
average than other groups.116  Behavioral overcharge in other categories of
retail goods and services has not received sufficient distributional attention to
draw even preliminary conclusions.117
110 See Bar-Gill & Stone, supra note 9, at 432.
111 Bar-Gill & Stone, supra note 84, at 55.
112 See Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 41, at 511.
113 See Lieke Boonen et al., Switching Health Insurers: The Role of Price, Quality and Con-
sumer Information Search, 17 EUR. J. HEALTH ECON. 339, 349 (2016).
114 Meghan R. Busse et al., Repairing the Damage: The Effect of Price Knowledge and Gender
on Auto Repair Price Quotes, 54 J. MARKETING RES. 75, 76 (2017).
115 See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations,
104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 835, 854 (1991) (describing how auto salespeople target “suckers”
in disadvantaged communities by offering inferior prices to those offered to other consum-
ers).  Because these studies look at the prices offered, rather than ultimately paid, it is less
clear whether those strategies succeed.  In one follow-up study attempting to infer race
from national data, no difference in final price paid was found. See Pinelopi Koujianou
Goldberg, Dealer Price Discrimination in New Car Purchases: Evidence from the Consumer Expendi-
ture Survey, 104 J. POL. ECON. 622 (1996).  Aside from difficulties in identifying race, the
study also was unable to differentiate whether for the same price paid one car may have
had more features, such as air conditioning. See id.
116 See Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Reform Discourse, 32 VA. TAX REV. 205, 221 (2012).
117 The question of whether low-income consumers pay more has been studied but is a
different question from who pays more overcharge.  Consumers may pay more at competi-
tive prices for convenience, for instance.  The literature on who pays more is, in any case,
inconclusive.  For a review and discussion, see, for example, Van Loo, supra note 5, at R
1357–59.
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The data limitations of these studies make it difficult to eliminate the
possibility that some wealthy consumers pay considerably more in over-
charge, at least in some categories.  For instance, anticompetitive practices
that make it more time-consuming to shop, such as arranging the Amazon
search results to put the best deal on page four, would affect groups with the
least amount of time—or who value their time the most.118  Over recent
decades, higher-income earners began to work longer hours.119  In theory,
ultrawealthy households could pay additional behavioral overcharge either
because they care less about price, have less time, or value their time more.
Many low-income households, such as single working parents, would face
similar time constraints.
Additionally, there is considerable variation in the products that differ-
ent income groups purchase.  As some scholars point out, wealthier consum-
ers are more likely to buy expensive products, such as luxury automobiles,
gem-quality diamonds, and high-end art.120  If overcharge levels are unusu-
ally high in such high-end subcategories, the elimination of overcharge in
their larger categories—such as all automobiles—could disproportionately
benefit the wealthy.  Moreover, it is possible that the evidence available
points mostly to overcharge harming the poor because academics are less
interested in overcharge paid by the rich.
Beyond direct studies of inequality, several inferences can be made from
other data sets.  Differences exist also across categories of consumer goods.
For instance, the lowest-income households, those earning less than $20,000
annually, spend 2.9% of their budgets on telephone expenditures, compared
to 1.7% for the highest-earning households.121  Eliminating the 8% over-
118 See Elizabeth A. Harris, The Social Showroom: Retailers Seek Online Partners to Put Prod-
ucts Where People Can See Them, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2013, at B1 (reporting on pricing prac-
tices such as switching out bar codes).
119 See DANIEL MARKOVITS, THE MERITOCRACY TRAP 3–5 (2019); Orazio Attanasio et al.,
The Evolution of Income, Consumption, and Leisure Inequality in the United States, 1980–2010, in
IMPROVING THE MEASUREMENT OF CONSUMER EXPENDITURES 100, 104 (Christopher D. Car-
roll et al. eds., 2015) (discussing time-use surveys indicating that low-educated households
spend “much more time in leisure relative to their highly educated counterparts”); Peter
Kuhn & Fernando Lozano, The Expanding Workweek? Understanding Trends in Long Work
Hours Among U.S. Men, 1979–2004, at 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 11895, 2005).
120 See Crane, supra note 16, at 1204 (pointing out that these categories may have anti-
trust-related overcharge).  Additionally, in some of these subcategories, it is particularly
difficult to quantify overcharge in some more likely to be purchased by ultrawealthy con-
sumers, such as high-end art, in which the status of the products sold is part of what the
buyer seeks. See Young Jee Han et al., Signaling Status with Luxury Goods: The Role of Brand
Prominence, J. MARKETING, July 2010, at 15, 15.
121 This figure is for the highest-income group available in the federal data, which are
households earning over $150,000 annually. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T
OF LABOR, TABLE 1110. DECILES OF INCOME BEFORE TAXES: ANNUAL EXPENDITURE MEANS,
SHARES, STANDARD ERRORS, AND COEFFICIENTS OF VARIATION, CONSUMER EXPENDITURE SUR-
VEY, 2014 (2014), https://www.bls.gov/cex/2014/combined/decile.pdf.  As another exam-
ple, a significantly higher portion of their expenditures on categories such as food, which
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charge from mistaken cellphone-plan choice would thus disproportionately
benefit low-income consumers,122 even if they are equally represented in the
subcategory most susceptible to behavioral overcharge.123
Despite considerable heterogeneity and data limitations, several points
in support of overcharge’s impact on inequality are worth emphasizing.
First, high-income consumers spend a lower percentage of what they take
home, since they invest or save a larger portion.  One of the leading studies
concludes that the highest-earning one percent of households save 51% of
their after-tax income, while middle-income earners save about 11%, and the
bottom fifth of households save 1%.124  Based solely on this difference, an
equal reduction of all consumer overcharge would disproportionately benefit
low- and middle-income households as a percentage of their income since
those households spend much larger portions of their income annually.
Second, the heterogeneity of spending across product categories offers
several benefits to consumer law as a policy instrument.  That variability in
spending allows authorities to prioritize addressing certain categories of over-
charge that disproportionately harm low-income consumers.  For example,
regulators might focus their efforts on food and cellphone overcharge, where
low-income consumers spend a greater share of their budget.125  Finally, the
few direct studies available suggest that lower-income consumers dispropor-
tionately pay for overcharge.126
B. Earning Income from Overcharge
In addition to altering consumer spending, overcharge can shift the dis-
tribution of income.  The top-level inquiry requires determining which
groups earn income when a firm receives extra revenues from overcharge.
This raises a threshold subissue: whether the overcharge is even profitable for
the firm.  A company earning $100 million in overcharge from deception
might spend $99 million annually researching how to deceive consumers into
paying more, leaving little overcharge profit that could become income.127
In that instance, overcharge is unlikely to influence income inequality sub-
stantially.  In the alternative, the company might need to spend almost noth-
makes up 16% of their budget, compared to the highest-earning households, who spend
about 10.5% of their annual budget on food. Id.
122 This is as a percent of their income.  For the 8% figure, see Bar-Gill & Stone, supra
note 9, at 453.
123 Cf. id. at 453 (estimating that one in six overpay by 20%).
124 See Karen E. Dynan et al., Do the Rich Save More?, 112 J. POL. ECON. 397, 416 tbl.3
(2004).  Other studies of households by wealth have found similar disparities in savings
rates, but different overall savings rates. See Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth
Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q.J.
ECON. 519, app. tbl.B44, (2010), http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/SaezZucman2016QJE
Appendix.pdf.
125 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
126 See supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text.
127 Similarly, if it were more expensive to operate businesses in concentrated industries,
that could mean some of the concentration overcharge was lost to higher costs.
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ing to earn that $100 million in overcharge.  It could, for instance, simply
copy a competitor’s complex pricing scheme.
The issue of overcharge profitability depends on internal firm expendi-
tures.  Behavioral overcharge no doubt requires companies to invest in mar-
keting.  They must develop complex pricing structures and search for
vulnerable customers, among other expenditures.128  Although data about
such expenditures are rarely publicly available, a number of empirical analy-
ses have used outside-in methods to estimate the proportion of overcharge
that is profitable.  For instance, Bar-Gill and Ryan Bubb found that regula-
tions reducing credit card companies’ behavioral overcharge lowered profits
proportionally.129  In the market for headache-relief drugs, Bronnenberg
and his coauthors estimate that more informed consumers “would reduce
the variable profits of the national headache remedy brands by half,
equivalent to 19 percent of total expenditure.”130  A study of insurance simi-
larly concluded that most behavioral overcharge is profit.131  These examina-
tions and others, both theoretical and empirical, indicate an academic
consensus that firms profit substantially through overcharge.132
Although widespread unprofitable overcharge is unlikely, from the per-
spective of whether to regulate, unprofitable overcharge would make a
stronger case for regulatory intervention.133  Whereas higher business profits
128 See, e.g., Susan E. Woodward & Robert E. Hall, Diagnosing Consumer Confusion and
Sub-Optimal Shopping Effort: Theory and Mortgage-Market Evidence, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 3249,
3255 (2012) (“Mortgage brokers dissipate the anticipated margin from confused borrowers
by spending effort and other resources trying to find these customers.”).
129 See Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 58, at 999–1000 (finding that after the Credit Card
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 forced down hidden fees, industry
revenue and profitability declined by comparably large amounts).  This measure would
leave out the up-front expenditures to develop the practices that are thereafter purely
profitable.
130 Bronnenberg et al., supra note 79, at 1675.
131 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 56, at 12–13 (“[T]he gain of insurers’ profits due to overin-
surance are in proportion to the extent of overinsurance.”).
132 See, e.g., Cebul et al., supra note 56, at 1843; Glenn Ellison, A Model of Add-On Pricing,
120 Q.J. ECON. 585, 589 (2005) (“Perhaps the most important contribution of this paper is
that it identifies a reason why the joint adoption of add-on pricing can raise equilibrium
profits.”); Grubb, supra note 45, at 318 (reviewing the literature showing that, in equilib-
rium, firms’ efforts at obfuscation result in consumer confusion and sustained profits);
Lee, supra note 59, at 2 (“[O]verestimation of the probability of loss . . . increases insurers’
profits . . . .”); Donald Ngwe, Fake Discounts Drive Real Revenues in Retail 20 (Harvard Bus.
Sch., Working Paper No. 18-113, 2018), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20
Files/fictitious_pricing_current_02060238-0856-447d-9eda-5987a7788eb8.pdf (concluding
that fictitious pricing offers “a potentially powerful driver of demand that is virtually
costless to produce and adjust”). But see Crane, supra note 16, at 1187–88 (questioning the
profitability of overcharge related to antitrust).
133 Unprofitable overcharge could exist for a number of reasons, such as cross-subsidi-
zation (some customers’ profits are used to lower the price to other customers).  Another
possibility is that all companies must spend money to deceive consumers even though the
companies then still earn little profit because they compete vigorously at the misperceived
price.  Any company attempting to save money by not investing in deception might then be
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at least have the advantage of providing an additional incentive to start a new
business, unprofitable overcharge would mean that companies are simply
spending more to charge higher prices—in other words, that they are unnec-
essarily inefficient and wasteful.  Given the broad support for policies that
increase efficiency, the more overcharge that is wasted, the stronger the case
for great societal benefits derived from intervening to reduce overcharge.
Even if policymakers were operating under the assumption that over-
charge is profitable, they must consider which groups benefit from the addi-
tional profit.  Overcharge is subject to the power struggle among owners,
labor, and management.  Senior executives or other employees could cap-
ture such excesses as income, and some portion could reach owners through
dividends or other means.134
Although consumer protection scholars have yet to explore the issue in
any depth,135 antitrust scholars have mostly concluded that antitrust-related
overcharge contributes significantly to income inequality because sharehold-
ers and senior management capture excess profits.136  Daniel Crane offers a
different perspective, arguing that “[c]ontrary to the assumption that share-
holders and senior managers are capturing virtually all of the monopoly rents
obtained by corporations, the evidence suggests that a significant amount of
rent sharing occurs within the firm.”137  If so, overcharge might not increase
income inequality, as middle- and lower-income workers would also earn
higher incomes from it.  Einer Elhauge believes Crane’s argument is incon-
sistent with the empirical literature, and instead concludes “that anticompeti-
tive practices increase economic inequality.”138
The challenge with evaluating the merits of these conclusions is that
much of the evidence in recent years is inferential.  Some direct empirical
studies from decades ago, on which Crane relies, conclude that broad shar-
ing of monopoly rents occurs.139  But recent studies have underscored the
difficulty in answering that question, and the institutional dynamics of distri-
bution have changed considerably over the past several decades.  Households
in the top one percent dramatically increased their share of national income
perceived as offering a worse price or product, even if consumers would be wrong in that
conclusion.  Again, the theory and evidence suggest overcharge is profitable, but the possi-
bility of unprofitable overcharge in some contexts cannot be ruled out.
134 Profits retained by the firm could, for instance, increase the value of the ownership
share, which could then be sold for what amounts to personal income for the owner.
135 Some scholars have, in passing, recognized a potential connection. See, e.g., Bar-Gill
& Stone, supra note 9, at 454 (“[R]edistribution occurs when carriers profit from consumer
mistakes if shareholders tend to be richer than consumers.”); Van Loo, supra note 5, at
1359 (concluding that a lack of consumer protection in retail goods may increase the
income gap).
136 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
137 See Crane, supra note 16, at 1192.
138 Elhauge, supra note 9, at 1293; see also Baker & Salop, supra note 16, at 4 (conclud-
ing that antitrust influences income inequality); Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 22, at
235–36 (concluding that monopolies and oligopolies contribute to income inequality).
139 See Crane, supra note 16, at 1192 (summarizing the literature).
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between 1980—when they earned about 10% of all income—and 2010, when
they earned over 20% of all income.140  That period also saw a large jump in
executive pay.141  Labor unions helped nonmanagerial employees to capture
monopoly profits for higher wages in the past.142  But unions have declined
over that timeframe, leaving only about six percent of private sector employ-
ees unionized today.143  Moreover, business organizations have become far
leaner, most notably by designing more efficient processes and leveraging
technologies to remove excess workers, in what many saw as the “streamlin-
ing of bloated America[ ].”144  In light of these drastic shifts in industrial
organization, studies of monopoly rent distribution in the 1980s and even the
1990s are of limited relevance today, and it is likely that lower-level employ-
ees’ bargaining power has diminished in recent decades, making them less
able to capture overcharge.
The case for higher-income employees capturing a large portion of
anticompetitive pricing is intuitively persuasive, but indirect.  Senior execu-
tives and managers are two of the largest categories of employees in the top
one percent.145  Executive pay has risen along with income inequality.  The
average CEO in the S&P 500 earned forty times the average worker in 1980,
but three hundred fifty times the average worker in 2013.146  Executives have
also steadily increased the share of their firms’ net income that they earn,
with the top five executives’ share of net profits rising from 7% to 10%
between 1993 and 2003 alone.147  Scholars have argued that rent extraction
contributes to this growth in executive pay,148 and have developed theoreti-
140 See PIKETTY, supra note 3, app. tbl.S8.2, http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/capital21c/ R
en/pdf/supp/TS8.2.pdf.
141 See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
142 See Robert Smiley, Firm Size, Market Power and the Distribution of Income and Wealth: A
Survey, in THE ECONOMICS OF FIRM SIZE, MARKET STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL PERFORMANCE 90,
98 (John J. Siegfried ed., 1980) (“[I]t appears likely that workers do share somewhat in
monopoly rents, if only through the unionization effect.”); cf. Elhauge, supra note 9, at
1294–95 (reviewing the literature).
143 See News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Mem-
bers—2016, at 1 (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.managementmemo.com/files/2017/02/
BLS-2016.pdf (“Public-sector workers had a union membership rate (34.4 percent) more
than five times higher than that of private-sector workers (6.4 percent).”).
144 Thomas W. Joo, Legislation and Legitimation: Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s,
82 IND. L.J. 575, 594 (2007) (noting common views on the subject).
145 See Jeremy White et al., The Top 1 Percent: What Jobs Do They Have?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/newsgraphics/2012/0115-one-per
cent-occupations/.
146 Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer, 54 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1232, 1235 (2016).
147 See Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL’Y 283, 284 (2005) (finding that the top five executives in publicly traded compa-
nies increased their average share of their companies’ net income from 6.6% in 1993–1995
to 9.8% in 2001–2003).
148 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, et al., The CEO Pay Slice, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 199, 200–01
(2011); Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 147, at 284.
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cal models linking managerial power and pay.149  But they have yet to link
executive pay to overcharge empirically in any definitive manner.
Moving beyond executive pay, others have begun to present broader
empirical evidence on the connection between rents and inequality.  The
authors of one study concluded that their analysis “suggests that the distribu-
tion of rents may have become increasingly skewed, with an increasing share
going to high-wage workers.”150  Arthur Sakamoto and ChangHwan Kim
recently showed that as margins increase in manufacturing and finance, man-
agers and professionals capture the gains but other workers do not.151  But
without knowing whether these margins are due to overcharge or superior
firm performance, it is possible that more profitable firms simply pay their
more talented workers more.152
The evidence that wealthy owners capture an inordinate amount of over-
charge is stronger than the evidence for wealthier employees.  Households in
the top one percent of earners own most of business equity, between 55%
and 60%.153  Thus, whatever portion is distributed to owners would on aver-
age contribute to income inequality.154  Although the progressive income
redistribution from reducing overcharge would be less immediate and direct
than on the spending side, in theory, reducing overcharge should over time
increase the income earned by workers outside the top one percent.
C. Summary of Inequality and Overcharge
The issue of precisely how much overcharge increases inequality
remains open, because that question is so complex and depends on data that
is not available.  It would be a mistake, however, to ignore the empirical stud-
ies and theory in forming a perspective.  What then would be the best work-
ing hypothesis moving forward?
On the spending side, lower-income consumers are likely less insulated
from overcharge for two main reasons.  First, they are more vulnerable to
significant categories of overcharge—particularly related to finance.  Second,
149 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 754 (2002) (proposing an analytical model
that views compensation decisions through the lens of managerial power and influence).
150 Jae Song et al., Firming Up Inequality, 134 Q.J. ECON. 1, 6 (2019).
151 See Arthur Sakamoto & ChangHwan Kim, Bringing Productivity Back In: Rising Ine-
quality and Economic Rents in the U.S. Manufacturing Sector, 1971 to 2001, 55 SOC. Q. 282,
295–97 (2014); Donald Tomaskovic-Devey & Ken-Hou Lin, Income Dynamics, Economic
Rents, and the Financialization of the U.S. Economy, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 538, 551 (2011).
152 See Holger M. Mueller et al., Within-Firm Pay Inequality, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 3605, 3632
(2017) (concluding that differences in managerial talent, not rent seeking, explain why
higher income workers earn more in high-margin firms).
153 See Arthur B. Kennickell, Ponds and Streams: Wealth and Income in the U.S., 1989 to
2007, at 2–3, 78–79, fig.A5a (Fed. Reserve Bd., Finance and Economics Discussion Series
No. 2009-13, 2009) (calculating business owned directly and indirectly such as through
retirement accounts).
154 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.  Of course, there would be variation by
companies and industries, depending on ownership composition.
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they spend considerably more of their income.  Moreover, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, it would make more sense to assume that over-
charge in the markets yet to be studied would produce similar regressive
results in light of the theory, indirect evidence, and deployment of related
behavioral pricing tactics.  The working hypothesis should thus be that reduc-
ing overcharge would benefit low- and middle-income consumers the most in
terms of savings on spending.  Even without that assumption, however, what
is currently known provides sufficient evidence of a meaningful connection
between overcharge and income level in a significant subset of consumer
spending.
Additionally, if the scholars who believe that antitrust-related overcharge
and entry barriers also contribute to income inequality are correct—which
the research overall suggests—consumer-protection-related overcharge
should as well.155  But that raises the question of the potential magnitude of
consumer law’s impact on inequality.  For the sake of illustration, consider a
static accounting simulation in which senior managers split all overcharge
equally with owners—many of whom are middle-income earning households,
through stock ownership.  Under that assumption of split internal distribu-
tion between managers and owners, removing a trillion dollars in overcharge
from the economy would lower the share of income earned by the top one
percent of households from about 20% today to about 15%.156  Those num-
bers are, however, heavily influenced by the assumptions made.  Using the
same basic simulation, if it is instead assumed that senior managers capture
75% of the overcharge within the firm, and the overall level of overcharge
reduced is $1.5 trillion, the share of income earned by the top one percent
falls to 11%.157
To put these hypothetical numbers in perspective, the dramatic increase
in inequality that originally prompted global leaders’ and Occupy Wall Street
protesters’ concerns about inequality in the first place was that in the early
1980s the top one percent of households earned close to 12% of all income,
but that share had since shot up to about 20%.158  Thus, under basic assump-
tions consistent with the preliminary research available, removing overcharge
could even return income shares to close to their most evenly distributed
155 See, e.g., Edlin & Haw, supra note 100 (linking occupational licensing to inequality).
156 There are multiple ways to conduct such a simulation.  These figures are based on
tracing the overcharge payments through the economy using federal spending, income,
and ownership data. See Van Loo, supra note 101.  This 15% figure rests on core assump-
tions that most of this trillion dollars in overcharge is profitable in the sense of increasing
margins; that senior executives rather than mid- and low-level employees capture a mean-
ingful portion as income before distribution to ownership; and that the remaining over-
charge becomes income for households in proportion to their overall share of business
ownership, a substantial portion of which goes to middle-income and even affluent house-
holds outside the top one percent. Id.  The static approach contrasts with a dynamic
model, discussed below.
157 Id.
158 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-1\NDL105.txt unknown Seq: 31 26-NOV-19 8:43
2019] broadening  consumer  law 241
levels in the past century.159  Moreover, those income adjustments are sepa-
rate from the spending side, which would put large sums of money put back
into all consumers’ pockets—and presumably into low- and middle-income
consumers’ pockets at disproportionate rates.
The static simulation that produced these illustrative figures ignores
many variables, such as total annual household expenditures, employment
levels, prices, inflation, market size, education levels, and savings rates.  A
more dynamic simulation that included these and other factors could go
either direction, but based on economic theory that broader set of factors
would be expected to show even greater economic gains from reducing over-
charge.160  Still, since it is not possible with existing data to produce a rigor-
ous estimate of how consumer law affects income inequality, even a static
simulation helps to inform the question of whether consumer law merits
examination by those who are looking to reverse the rise in income inequal-
ity in recent decades.
It is also worth noting that one leading study has concluded that busi-
ness markups over marginal-cost pricing increased from about 21% in 1980
to 67% by 2018.161  A historical narrative of overcharge causing inequality is
not central to, or necessary for supporting, this Article’s argument.  But as I
have argued elsewhere, companies’ ability to engage in behavioral over-
charge has increased significantly due to sophisticated pricing algorithms
and quantitative insights into consumers.162  Industry concentration has also
by many accounts steadily risen over time.  A plausible inference, and hypoth-
esis worth testing, is that increases in businesses’ ability to obtain overcharge
contributed to the growth in income inequality.163  If true, the possibility of
lowering inequality through consumer law becomes even more worthy of
exploration.
In short, although more study is needed to estimate the magnitude and
scope, policymakers and enforcement authorities must make decisions based
159 See Piketty et al., supra note 14 (providing longitudinal data on income
distribution).
160 Based on economic theory, simulating a broader set of factors should indicate
greater overall gains from reduced overcharge, such as a faster-growing economy due to
higher consumer spending.  A more comprehensive analysis would presumably over time
also indicate even higher reductions in inequality as the effect of accumulated wealth is
considered—which provides greater income in future years. See Van Loo, supra note 101.
161 Jan De Loecker et al., The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implica-
tions 53 (Nov. 22, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.janeeckhout.com/wp-
content/uploads/RMP.pdf (noting that overcharge may be large and estimating that the
markup above competitive level (marginal cost pricing) has increased from about 21% in
1980 to 61%). But see Mark Bils et al., Resurrecting the Role of the Product Market Wedge in
Recessions, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 1118, 1136 (2018) (producing findings consistent with no
trend in price-cost markup).
162 See, e.g., Van Loo, supra note 5 (discussing firms’ rising ability to earn overcharge). R
163 There are surely various structural causes of, and potential solutions to, rising ine-
quality. See Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Private Wealth and Public Goods: A Case
for a National Investment Authority, 43 J. CORP. L. 437, 438 (2018).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-1\NDL105.txt unknown Seq: 32 26-NOV-19 8:43
242 notre dame law review [vol. 95:1
on the facts available—even if that decision is not to act.  Based on the data
available, it would be sensible to conclude that consumer protection can be a
powerful vehicle for achieving distributional goals because it directly
addresses two types of inequality—in spending and income.  Either one of
these alone is already meaningful.  Yet they have a cumulative effect.  In light
of the existing research on the size of overcharge and its distributional
effects, the most empirically informed working hypothesis is that correcting
consumer overcharge would significantly lessen consumption inequality.
That starting point is the opposite of the one often adopted by policymakers
and even scholars—that the relationship is unworthy of attention.
III. CONSUMER LAW’S POTENTIAL TO REDUCE OVERCHARGE
Given the theory and preliminary evidence suggesting that overcharge is
large and has a big impact on equality, intervention should appeal to policy-
makers who believe that regulation would work.  This Part explores the avail-
able evidence and political path forward.
A. Assessing Whether Consumer Law Works
Generations of scholars have warned of the risks and documented the
failures of consumer market regulation.164  The intention of such warnings
was not necessarily to discourage regulation.  Nonetheless, there has been
less sustained attention to the promise of consumer market interventions.
To adopt an informed perspective, it is necessary to have a fuller sense of its
potential rewards alongside those well-documented risks.
A common concern is that market regulation can end up harming those
whom lawmakers intended to help.  In a classic qualitative study of regulating
slum housing markets on behalf of the poor, Bruce Ackerman articulated the
fear that “landlords who are required to improve their properties to code
standards will simply pass on the added costs to their tenants by increasing
rents or . . . will abandon the properties entirely, thereby depriving tenants of
even sub-code accommodations.”165  Similar reasoning surfaces in arguments
about payday loans because banning them could deprive vulnerable popula-
tions of valuable access to credit.166  The law and economics literature has
formalized and expanded on those concerns, showing how excess or ill-
advised regulation can hurt the economy by reducing market efficiency or
164 See, e.g., Michael Barr et al., The Case for Behaviorally Informed Regulation, in NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 25, 42 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009); George J.
Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1962).
165 See Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing
Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1095 (1971).
166 The evidence on this question is mixed. See, e.g., Angela Littwin, Testing the Substitu-
tion Hypothesis: Would Credit Card Regulations Force Low-Income Borrowers into Less Desirable
Lending Alternatives?, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 403 (2009); Paige Marta Skiba, Regulation of Pay-
day Loans: Misguided?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1023, 1024 (2012).
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weakening small businesses.167  This broader category of hard regulations
also faces resistance for being paternalistic because it restricts choices.168
Partly due to the intellectual and political resistance, policymakers in
recent decades have turned to lighter forms of regulation that preserve
choice and instead “nudge” people toward better outcomes.169  For instance,
workers who want to save for retirement often do not enroll in retirement
plans.  Instead of mandating that all workers have a 401(k) plan, lawmakers
can increase participation by requiring employers to make enrollment in a
401(k) the default unless a worker opts out.170  These reforms leverage the
insights of behavioral law and economics, “broadly regarded in recent years
as among the most promising and exciting new developments in public poli-
cymaking theory and practice.”171  The intellectual appeal of behavioral eco-
nomics stems from the hope that insights into “the actual cognitive
frameworks . . . of choice-making individuals will provide a sounder founda-
tion than neoclassical economics can for the design of legislation and regula-
tion.”172  The political appeal lies in the possibility of intervening without
restricting choice, and thus allowing lawmakers “to have [their] cake and eat
it too.”173
The explosion in what may be broadly described as behavioral interven-
tions has led to two high-profile critiques that have dampened enthusiasm for
what had been consumer law’s most politically promising path to regulation.
One is that businesses can adapt easily to the new mandates.  Lauren Willis
argued that defaults are “slippery” if businesses can convince the consumer
to opt into the harmful behavior.174  Willis used the example of checking-
account overage fees, which are incurred when the customer attempts to
withdraw more money than is available in the account—even if the customer
167 See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, The Freedom to Fail: Market Access as the Path to Overcom-
ing Poverty and Inequality, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 41, 45 (2017) (arguing that consumer
financial regulations hurt small businesses and increase inequality); Richard A. Posner, The
Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807, 807 (1975) (concluding that
public regulation is a larger source of public costs than private monopoly).
168 Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1161 (2003) (referencing “the straightforward insistence that, in
general, people should be free to opt out of specified arrangements if they choose to do
so”).
169 See, e.g., id. at 1162 (“Libertarian paternalism is a relatively weak and nonintrusive
type of paternalism, because choices are not blocked or fenced off.”).
170 Id. at 1159–60.
171 See Bubb & Pildes, supra note 19, at 1595.
172 Id.
173 Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for
“Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1212 (2003).  It should be noted that
some interventions labeled nudges provide an alternative choice that is “meaningless for
people who do not have the cognitive or motivational resources needed to overcome the
nudge,” which “cannot ever be truly libertarian nudges.”  Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian
Nudges, 82 MO. L. REV. 695, 698 (2017).
174 Willis, supra note 20.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-1\NDL105.txt unknown Seq: 34 26-NOV-19 8:43
244 notre dame law review [vol. 95:1
is just a penny short.175  Overage fees had often led to surprise and acciden-
tal charges of thirty dollars or more that could pile up with each purchase.176
Rather than banning the fees, however, Congress passed legislation requiring
banks to gain customer permission before enrolling them in the fee-heavy
plan, with the default being that the bank would simply deny the with-
drawal.177  That mechanism responded to behavioral research suggesting
that people rarely changed the default, and thus defaults were “sticky.”178
Willis concluded that the legislation proved less effective because bank sales
representatives convinced large numbers of customers—especially those who
were low income—to opt in by exploiting confusion and calling the overage
fee programs by names such as “Account Protector.”179
The second highly influential critique of consumer regulation is Omri
Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider’s argument that “mandated disclosure
repeatedly fails to accomplish its ends.”180  After demonstrating how the aver-
age consumer is inundated with mandated disclosures throughout the day,
from the milk carton nutrition label to the end-user license agreement on
computer software, they give numerous examples of how consumers often do
not read or understand the disclosures, and those that do read the disclosure
often react differently than how policymakers intended.181  Ryan Bubb and
Richard H. Pildes point out an irony in all of these disappointments: for the
reasons that behavioral economics identifies—people often act irrationally—
many of the policies animated by excitement about behavioral economics are
doomed to fail because they still rely on people to make good decisions.182
Perhaps in light of those limitations, many policymakers have sought dis-
closures for automated assistants rather than people, what can be seen as the
rise of the digital regulator.183  The idea is that an online tool can remove
175 Id. at 1174.
176 Id. at 1175–76.
177 See id. (discussing how fees were often large relative to the amount withdrawn).
178 See id. at 1161 (“The particular mechanisms that give defaults power can be divided
into three classes: transaction barriers, judgment and decision biases, and preference
formation.”).
179 Id. at 1182 (quoting Standard Overdraft Services: Are You In?, SOVEREIGN BANK, http://
www.sovereignbank.com/personal/promotions/sovereign-account-protector.asp (last vis-
ited Sept. 11, 2013).; id. at 1184 (outlining how financial institutions respond strategically
to regulations in ways that undermine regulatory intent).
180 See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 19, at 665 (“The great paradox of the
Disclosure Empire is that even as it grows, so also grows the evidence that mandated disclo-
sure repeatedly fails to accomplish its ends.  We proffer several kinds of evidence of that
failure.  First, disclosers do not always provide, and disclosees do not always receive, infor-
mation.  Second, disclosees often do not read disclosed information, do not understand it
when they read it, and do not use it even if they understand it.  Third, mandated disclosure
does not improve disclosees’ decisions.”).
181 Id. at 664–65.  Ben-Shahar and Schneider saw the most potential in smart disclo-
sures aimed at sophisticated intermediaries, such as price-comparison engines. Id. at
746–47.
182 Bubb & Pildes, supra note 19, at 1595.
183 Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1268–70 (2017).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-1\NDL105.txt unknown Seq: 35 26-NOV-19 8:43
2019] broadening  consumer  law 245
the human error by processing and simplifying the disclosed information—
such as price, product data, and reviews—and thereby regulate over-
charge.184  However, smart disclosures have also proven to be more complex
and involved than its designers realized because, among other challenges,
humans still must decide which digital helper to use and must process its
advice effectively despite potential bias.185  Additionally, entrepreneurs
launching proconsumer online tools have faced considerable regulatory and
anticompetitive obstacles.186  These many real failures and disappointments
of behavioral economics are important to recognize but do not mean con-
sumer law as a whole is ineffective.
Instead, these complications indicate that empirics are needed to settle
whether consumer law can achieve its desired effects.  Since most of these
critiques arose during the early period of applying new interventions, they
did not incorporate many rich empirical studies that required several years to
develop.  A review of that evidence follows.
Although scholars have often provided theoretical support for market-
specific interventions as a result of the problem they identify,187 the most
important literature to consider is that studying real-world interventions.  In
2007, the Italian Parliament approved a law requiring large electronic signs
along the highways showing the prices of all nearby gas stations.188  One
study found that this single intervention lowered prices and reduced profit
margins by 20%.189  Price transparency mandates in the German market sim-
ilarly produced a 13% decrease in gas stations’ margins following pricing
signs.190  Because gasoline is fungible, it presents a more straightforward
decision-making context and is more conducive for consumers to process dis-
closures and for policymakers to design interventions.  However, similar
interventions work in other contexts.
Supermarkets involve a less straightforward decision context, given the
many different goods that shoppers must compare to figure out which store
to visit.191  An Israeli law passed in 2015 required stores to release their price
184 Id. at 1275.
185 See, e.g., id. at 1289–90; see also Christopher G. Bradley, Fintech’s Double Edges, 93
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61, 62 (2018) Matthew A. Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic
Lenders’ Use of Big Data, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (2017); William Magnuson, Regulating
Fintech, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1167 (2018).
186 See Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117 MICH. L. REV. 815, 815 (2019).
187 By one account, for instance, “savings from imposing even moderately more intense
shopping on all U.S. credit card borrowers would be $36 billion per annum.” Victor Stango
& Jonathan Zinman, Borrowing High Versus Borrowing Higher: Price Dispersion and Shopping
Behavior in the U.S. Credit Card Market, 29 REV. FIN. STUD. 979, 981 (2016).
188 Rossi & Chintagunta, supra note 69, at 408.
189 Id. at 409.
190 Felix Montag & Cristoph Winter, Price Transparency Against Market Power 3 (Aug.
6, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3256476 (finding that
mandatory price disclosure in the German petrol market decreased retail margins by about
13%).
191 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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and product information in machine-readable form.192  The law enabled
entrepreneurs to launch online price-comparison tools that many shoppers
used to decide where to buy.193  Within a few years, scholars concluded that
the legislation had reduced retail prices by 4%–5%.194
Examinations of even more complex decision contexts have produced
comparable results.  Recall the study finding that Medicare patients pay 30%
more due to their inability to select the best plan given the options availa-
ble.195  Researchers sent a letter with personalized information clarifying
patients’ Medicare prescription plan options to some consumers, and com-
pared the subsequent choice of plans to a control group that received a simi-
lar letter without the choice-selection help.196  The group that received the
helpful information saved 5% on average due to more optimal decisions.197
Other field experiments corroborate the possibility of information
improving choice in complex spending contexts.  In one, researchers
obtained the unusual cooperation of one of the largest nationwide payday
lenders to run a field experiment in seventy stores across eleven states, and
then to receive follow-up information about the customers four months
later.198  They tested various disclosures, including providing the total cost to
the borrower over the course of two months and comparing the annual inter-
est rate of over 400% to the typical credit card rate of under 30%.199  They
found that those groups exposed to lenders’ most powerful intervention
reduced their payday loan borrowing by 11%.200  Another study concluded
that a government website with information about medical procedures low-
ered the costs of medical procedures by 11%.201
Taken as a whole, the empirical research suggests that well-designed
behavioral interventions can significantly reduce consumer overcharge.202
These potential savings, though meaningful, do not reflect the total savings
made possible by disclosures.  Most are based only on a single type of inter-
vention, such as sending a letter with clarifying information, or only mandat-
ing price disclosure in machine-readable form.  A combination of behavioral
interventions could produce a larger impact.  The design of disclosures in
192 Itai Ater & Oren Rigbi, The Effects of Mandatory Disclosure of Supermarket Prices
1 (Oct. 2, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3046703.
193 See id.
194 Id.
195 See Abaluck & Gruber, supra note 54, at 1190.
196 See Kling et al., supra note 54, at 199.
197 See id.
198 Bertrand & Morse, supra note 63, at 1867 (specifying that permission was obtained
from the customers before sharing their information).
199 Id. at 1865–66.
200 See id. at 1865.
201 Zach Y. Brown, Equilibrium Effects of Health Care Price Information, 101 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 699, 699 (2019).
202 Cf. Quinn Curtis, Andrew Hayashi &Michael A. Livermore, Tacking in Shifting Winds:
A Short Response to Bubb and Pildes, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 204, 209 (2014) ( “[T]he capacity of
well-designed choice-preserving policies to increase welfare when carefully applied.”).
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the studies could also be improved for greater impact.  The letter sent to
Medicare patients, for instance, was not developed through an iterative pro-
cess and systematic testing of which framing is most likely to get the patient’s
attention and cause the desired behavior.  Well-designed combined interven-
tions could offer even more dramatic consumer savings.
Of course, companies might respond to the interventions by adapting
their behavior, potentially undermining disclosure’s efficacy.  The studies
examining the impact of sending a letter to Medicare patients or of posting
information through a cooperative payday lender do not reveal the ultimate
consumer savings after the seller has adjusted its practices.  However, some of
the studies do cover strategic business responses: those quantifying average
market prices over the span of several years, such as the European laws
requiring gasoline highway signs or the Israeli supermarket digital
disclosures.203
Most of the discussion thus far on effectiveness has addressed behavioral
interventions, or those relying on digital intermediaries, because those are
the politically most-supported type of consumer law. It is worth noting that
more direct prohibitions of behavior would be expected to produce even
larger magnitudes of reduction in overcharge.  For instance, in studying the
Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of
2009, scholars have found that the parts of the Act that imposed hard limits
on fees had a far stronger impact than the Act’s disclosures.204
Moreover, companies cannot always adjust following hard bans to simply
pass on the lost revenues to consumers.  Three studies by economists of the
CARD Act of 2009, which restricted credit card interest-rate hikes and fees,
and imposed disclosures in the monthly bill, show that the law transferred
billions of dollars of surplus from financial institutions to consumers without
the companies making up their lost revenues by raising prices or enacting
new fees elsewhere.205  Thus, although scholars are correct to point out that
consumer laws have sometimes failed to achieve the desired effectiveness, the
203 See Rossi & Chintagunta, supra note 69; supra note 192 and accompanying text.
204 See Agarwal et al., supra note 105, at 111.
205 Agarwal et al., supra note 105, at 111, 115 (estimating a nearly $12 billion transfer of
surplus from businesses to consumers and concluding that within the immediate two years
following CARD Act regulations, credit card companies did not make up lost fees by mov-
ing those fees elsewhere); Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 37, at 999–1000 (“Overall, through
our data, we saw . . . no substantial increases in other credit card rates and fees to compen-
sate for the consequent loss in fee revenue [from the CARD Act regulations].  Our findings
are corroborated by the fall in interest and fee revenues reported by credit card issuers
over the period.”); Nelson, supra note 107 (finding surplus increases for consumers came
at the expense of lender profit following the CARD Act); see also Aluma Zernik, Overdrafts:
When Markets, Consumers, and Regulators Collide, 26 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 3–4
(2018) (remarking that annual percentage rates that consumers pay on overdraft fees in
Israel and the United Kingdom are “less than a tenth of the rates in the United States” due
in large part to more significant consumer-oriented regulations in Israel and the United
Kingdom).
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evidence suggests that well-crafted consumer law interventions can succeed
in reducing consumer prices even in the face of adaptation by businesses.
These studies all speak to the potential to reduce overcharge, and most
directly to the possibility of transferring surplus from businesses to consum-
ers.  However, most do not measure the impact of that reduction on inequal-
ity—a problem that has a ready solution discussed below.206  Nonetheless,
studies of the CARD Act did find that consumers with lower credit scores—
who also have lower average incomes—benefited most from the
legislation.207
Additionally, the research speaks to that distributional question indi-
rectly.  Numerous studies above found that companies’ profit margins
decreased due to the interventions.208  In an immediate sense, that reduction
in profits should reduce income inequality given that owners are overall
wealthier than consumers.
In terms of which income groups benefit most from the disclosures, the
research is limited.  Borrowers without a college education responded dispro-
portionately to payday loan disclosures in terms of lowering their depen-
dence on such loans.209  However, it is possible that in some contexts those
with higher education would be more capable of processing the disclo-
sures.210  Whether or not the poor benefit more than other groups from
interventions, they still benefit,211 and may overall still have the most to gain
if the interventions are targeted at the practices and spending categories that
affect them the most.212
Despite the evidence that less-educated consumers may benefit more
from interventions, even if well-educated consumers benefit more the inter-
ventions could still reduce inequality.  Low-income consumers have long
been the top priority for consumer protection, but they are not the only
group of concern in an era of skyrocketing income inequality.  By some
accounts, the squeezing of the middle class is what defines the new “gilded”
age—the real gap that has emerged is between the ultrarich, those earning
millions of dollars per year, and everyone else.213  When masses of protestors
took to the streets of New York in 2011 for Occupy Wall Street, a large por-
tion of households referred to in the “we are the 99%” slogan were, statisti-
206 See infra Section III.B.
207 See Agarwal et al., supra note 105; supra note 105 and accompanying text.
208 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
209 Bertrand & Morse, supra note 63, at 1867.  A possible explanation for this is that
better-educated consumers are already performing some of the analyses and research that
the law could provide through disclosures.
210 Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 19, at 742; cf. Boonen et al., supra note 113, at
349 (“[S]earching for information has a stronger impact on the switching propensity of
higher than lower educated people . . . .”).
211 See, e.g., Boonen et al., supra note 113, at 349.
212 See infra Part IV.
213 See Saez & Zucman, supra note 124, at 523 (concluding that the decline in share of
the bottom 90% is driven by the middle class).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-1\NDL105.txt unknown Seq: 39 26-NOV-19 8:43
2019] broadening  consumer  law 249
cally speaking, college educated.214  Indeed, the main driver of the explosion
in income inequality is the ascendancy of the ultrawealthy—those in the
99.9th percentile.215  A consumer law reform affecting the bulk of consum-
ers, but mostly those outside the ultrawealthy, may thus reduce income ine-
quality where it has taken the biggest hit in recent decades.
To reiterate, many of the critiques raised about consumer law interven-
tions are still valid.  Consumer regulations sometimes miss their mark in
costly ways.  And there is evidence that in some cases, businesses are able to
offset regulation-driven losses in one area by increasing costs on other prod-
ucts.216  This Section’s thesis is not that consumer law is always the answer, or
works more often than not.217  Rather, there is strong evidence that con-
sumer law can have a significant positive impact, and the examples of its fail-
ures indicate merely how not to design those interventions.  For instance,
Natasha Sarin has concluded that consumer finance interventions targeting
nonsalient fees are more likely to succeed.218
More importantly, if policymakers adopt an empirically informed per-
spective, they can already have a sense of the magnitude of how much con-
sumer law interventions might reduce overcharge and benefit society.  Light
interventions have substantially reduced prices when designed well, and offer
particular promise when aimed at digital intermediaries.  Even the 4%–5%
savings from the Israeli supermarket context, if applied to spending on U.S.
goods, would amount to between $114 and $143 billion in savings.219
Although it is still unknown how much overcharge exists in many categories,
5% savings applied across all consumer spending would amount to almost
$700 billion of surplus transferred from businesses to consumers.220
Put simply, even behavioral interventions have potential to dramatically
redistribute wealth and reduce prices for all consumers.  If the political will
exists for harder interventions—such as banning specific deceptive prac-
tices—overcharge reductions could prove considerably greater in some
214 According to the 2018 Census Report, approximately 32.25% of Americans above
the age of eighteen have earned a bachelor’s degree or higher. Current Population Survey
(CPS), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/cps/data/cpstablecreator.html?#
(last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
215 See generally Piketty et al., supra note 14.
216 See, e.g., Vladimir Mukharlyamov & Natasha Sarin, The Impact of the Durbin Amend-
ment on Banks, Merchants, and Consumers 3 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Faculty Scholarship,
Paper No. 2046, 2019), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2046
(finding that banks offset losses from the Durbin Amendment by increasing fees on other
products, such as checking accounts).
217 Technical and social constraints should be leveraged alongside legal constraints.
See Christopher G. Bradley, The Consumer Protection Ecosystem: Law, Norms, and Technology, 97
DENV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3349190.
218 See Sarin, supra note 30.
219 See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
220 Calculated as 0.05 * $13.9 trillion. See Table 2.3.5, supra note 11 (estimating annual-
ized total consumer spending at $13.9 trillion in 2018.
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spending categories.221  When cast against that promising backdrop of con-
sumer law, the insightful nuances of prominent critiques should not be taken
as evidence that redistribution should be left to more predictable tax trans-
fers.  Instead, those critiques can serve the goal that many of their authors
intended: informing the path forward for designing dependable consumer
laws.222
B. Political Economy
Is it realistic to address distribution through consumer law in a deregu-
latory era?  Regulation restricting behavior is generally unpopular, while the
idea of “freedom of choice” has broad appeal.223  Large businesses and
wealthy individuals exert considerable influence on Congress.224  It is diffi-
cult to imagine new federal legislation increasing consumer law regulation
anytime soon.
On the other hand, taxes are unpopular as well.  The law and economics
framework rests on the assumption that tax redistribution will make up for
problematic inequality created by laws.  But that expected tax redistribution
often never arrives due to the “political impediments that must be sur-
mounted to achieve welfare-maximizing distributive results.”225  Consumer
law should thus not be left out of distributional conversations solely based on
its lack of popularity, any more than taxes should.
Moreover, at least among economists there is little doubt that consumer
regulation is necessary for efficient, well-functioning markets.226  By remov-
ing market distortions, consumer laws advance the ideals of free markets.
The Sherman Antitrust Act has been deemed a “super-statute” reflecting fun-
damental American values that transcend the four corners of the statute.227
221 In finance and insurance, in particular, the overcharge estimates suggest signifi-
cantly higher magnitudes. See supra Section I.B.
222 See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 19, at 651 (“We believe commentators
and lawmakers must instead undertake the intellectually burdensome and politically pain-
ful work of tailoring solutions to problems.”); Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer
Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309, 1316 (2015) (“[P]erformance-based regulation should be
undertaken as a purposeful experiment, one that promises to be a bridge to more effica-
cious forms of consumer law.”).
223 Bubb & Pildes, supra note 19, at 1594.
224 See, e.g., JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS 54–56 (2010);
Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in Constitutional Theory, 101 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1445, 1446 (2016).
225 Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and Econom-
ics, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1051, 1052–53 (2016).
226 See MANKIW, supra note 37, at 11–13 (illustrating the important role in economic
theory that regulation plays in well-functioning markets); PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 103,
at 2 (noting the “widely shared view that private interests operating in free markets, and
unchecked by effective government antitrust rules, will harm efficiency and consumer
welfare”).
227 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216,
1231–32 (2001).
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If competitive consumer markets are viewed as an alternative to either new or
existing taxes, it is plausible that consumer law could be seen as the better of
two undesirable centralized alternatives.
Additionally, taxes have one real lever for action: new legislation.  In
contrast, consumer law offers diverse political avenues.  Many consumer pro-
tection laws currently on the books, such as those prohibiting fictitious pric-
ing, would reduce overcharge but are not enforced.228  The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) could arguably fight excess prescription drug prices
through antitrust law.229  Public officials in all fifty states, and private plain-
tiffs can bring many consumer lawsuits, including for unfair and deceptive
acts, which are broadly defined so as to include many practices that lead to
overcharge.230  State authorities can also supervise their occupational licens-
ing boards more closely to curtail anticompetitive licenses.231  Although both
tax law and regulation face political resistance, consumer law does not
depend on legislation to improve distribution.
IV. TOWARD MACRO CONSUMER LAW
The potential for consumer law to reduce considerable regressive over-
charge raises the ultimate question of the path forward.  The clearest initial
step is for administrative agency leaders, advocates, attorneys general, and
even consumers themselves to leverage the full power of the law to reduce
companies’ ability to anticompetitively raise prices.  To determine the appro-
priate level of intervention, policymakers need to build stronger evidentiary
foundations.  A shift in the normative foundations for intervention would
further strengthen the consumer law framework.
A. Monitoring Overcharge
The first step is to exercise governmental authority to access business
data that will give a fuller picture of the scale and distributional impact of
overcharge. The private data collected would inform the conceptual shift
toward more macro analysis of consumer law.  In an immediate sense, the
goal would be to expand the quantitative analysis to integrate a broader set of
factors relevant to the full societal impact of any given intervention.
Although observers may debate whether the current evidence is suffi-
cient to expand regulation, the bar for collecting information is lower as a
228 See Friedman, supra note 73, at 922, 933.
229 See Harry First, Excessive Drug Pricing as an Antitrust Violation, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 701,
705 (2019); see also D. Daniel Sokol, Policing the Firm, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 785, 791
(2013) (“Scholars have estimated the U.S. cartel detection rate between 13 and 17
percent.”).
230 See, e.g., Prentiss Cox et al., Strategies of Public UDAP Enforcement, 55 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 37, 41 (2017); Van Loo, supra note 5, at 1369–72.
231 William M. Sage & David A. Hyman, Antitrust as Disruptive Innovation in Health Care:
Can Limiting State Action Immunity Help Save a Trillion Dollars?, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 723, 735,
750 (2017).
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matter of law and policy.232  Scholars have characterized quality information
as the “lifeblood” of good governance.233  By some accounts, “[p]erhaps the
most important and least intrusive aspect of any mechanism for regulating
human conduct is collecting information on the need for the regulation.”234
The key federal regulators able to act on overcharge, the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and FTC, have expansive information-
collection authority that would help to quantify more accurately the level of
overcharge and its distributional implications.235  If that authority comes up
short for any given desired analysis, or if regulators prove reluctant to use it,
Congress could grant additional authority or mandate minimum information
collection, as it has repeatedly throughout history to ensure safety, stabilize
the financial system, and protect the environment.236  However, legislation is
unnecessary for a significant uptick in overcharge monitoring and
analysis.237
232 By analogy, in criminal law, the bar is also lower for a criminal search than for a
conviction.  This analogy is loosely informative, by showing the relative difference between
exercising the power to collect information and the power to use that information to pros-
ecute those suspected of wrongdoing.  However, the standards for criminal law collection
of information and prosecution are both higher than the standards for civil law.  The impe-
tus for government information collection often comes from journalists, academics, or
other third parties alerting authorities of the need to know more.  The prototypical exam-
ple of this is Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle. See Roger Roots, A Muckraker’s Aftermath: The
Jungle of Meat-Packing Regulation After a Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2413, 2413–14
(2001).
233 Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory
Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 277 (2004) (“Information is the lifeblood of regulatory
policy.”); Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 1422, 1423 (2011) (“Good information is the lifeblood of effective governance.”)
(making “the commonplace observation—so obvious that it ought to be uncontroversial—
that many public decisions turn on some form of predictive judgment, such that a deci-
sionmaker’s choice does and should depend on the quality and content of the information
available to her”).
234 Thomas O. McGarity & Karl O. Bayer, Federal Regulation of Emerging Genetic Technolo-
gies, 36 VAND. L. REV. 461, 474 (1983).
235 On the extensive authority of the CFPB, and the underutilized authority of the FTC,
see Rory Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State: Monitoring Businesses in an Age of Surveillance,
72 VAND. L. REV. 1563 (2019).
236 See Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance Era, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 369 (2019) (reviewing the historical provision of monitoring authority).
237 Although the idea here is to conduct more regular analyses, the FTC and CFPB
have demonstrated their capabilities by conducting one-off, significant market-wide studies
of other topics. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, LEVERAGING TECHNOLOGY TO
EMPOWER MORTGAGE CONSUMERS AT CLOSING 11 (2015), https://files.consumer
finance.gov/f/201508_cfpb_leveraging-technology-to-empower-mortgage-consumers-at-
closing.pdf; FED. TRADE COMM’N, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY 37–38 (2016), https:/
/www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entity-activity-ftc-study/
p131203_patent_assertion_entity_activity_an_ftc_study_0.pdf (compelling companies to
provide nonpublic information to study patent competition).
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Companies possess troves of data relevant to filling the informational
gaps identified throughout this Article.  They continually run experiments to
see whether their profits go up when they introduce behavioral pricing prac-
tices.238  They have historical data about which employees—whether the
chief executives or low-level staff—received raises following increases in prof-
its.239  And in “a world where every action we take can be observed, recorded,
analyzed, and stored,” businesses know a great deal about their customers’
wealth even without directly asking.240  That abundance of private data could
furnish regulatory insights into the distributional consequences of consumer
law.
Although the bar for collecting information is lower than for intervening
in markets, it still requires justification.  I have previously discussed in greater
depth the normative foundations for regulatory collection of information, as
well as the need to adopt constraints and weigh its drawbacks.241 In brief,
businesses incur costs in supplying regulatory information, and the govern-
ment expends resources processing it.242  The burden of data collection
could be lessened in many ways, such as by statistically sampling only a few
companies’ data in a given market at any point in time, and perhaps
returning to the same market every few years.  The privacy risks must also be
weighed should regulators collect consumers’ personal data.243  The design
of the monitoring program can minimize such privacy risks, however, and
existing laws already constrain regulatory use of personal data—even holding
individuals criminally liable for misuse.244
Personal data is not necessary to make significant strides toward a macro
perspective on consumer law, since many markets lack any rigorous over-
charge studies and in previously studied markets a decade or longer often
passes without a rigorous estimate.  Thus, while the benefits and drawbacks of
varying levels and types of monitoring must be weighed, even occasional
modest increases in data collection would advance understanding
considerably.
238 See Van Loo, supra note 5, at 1331 (providing evidence of large-scale experimenta- R
tion to increase prices); cf. Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
995 (2014) (surveying sellers’ abilities to track, study, and monetize online behavior).
239 See, e.g., JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., BIG DATA: THE NEXT FRON-
TIER FOR INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY 6 (2011) (surveying uses of data).
240 Justin Brookman, Protecting Privacy in an Era of Weakening Regulation, 9 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 355, 355, 358–60 (2015) (summarizing the vast array of information that busi-
nesses have); Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 547, 565–66
(2016) (explaining how businesses purchase or create customer scores that give great
weight to estimated wealth).
241 Van Loo, supra note 235.
242 These costs include monetary costs to businesses of providing information and the
trade secrets of the business.
243 G.S. Hans, Curing Administrative Search Decay, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 2–3
(2018).
244 See Van Loo, supra note 235.
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Moreover, the FTC already implements safeguards in collecting sensitive
profit-related data for its antitrust analyses, as does the CFPB in analyzing
evidence of racial discrimination by lenders.245  The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission annually collects salary information from most
businesses nationwide in anonymized format to detect discrimination.246
The IRS holds sensitive personal information and business profit data in
nonanonymized forms.247  Thus, precedents exist for creating a successful
data-collection regime of valuable private business information that protects
privacy and minimizes burdens on industry.
The need to weigh costs and benefits and work out many design details
should not obscure the overall feasibility of information collection compared
to other interventions.  The available evidence of overcharge’s societal
impact—in terms of inequality and efficiency—should satisfy the lower bar
for collecting relevant information, even if there is disagreement about
whether that evidence currently justifies heightened intervention.
This information collection would enable a more comprehensive esti-
mate of the total overcharge paid by consumers in a given market, and per-
haps all of consumer spending.  Reaching such an aggregate figure requires
combining antitrust, consumer protection, and reforms to excess govern-
mental entry barriers.  Although these three categories of laws are sometimes
compared and contrasted in doctrinal discussions, they are quantitatively
mostly compartmentalized.248  Ellison and Ellison’s study of online com-
puter-accessory sales demonstrates the type of methodology that combines
the impact of diverse types of overcharge on a single purchase, because they
looked at overall markup above the competitive price—again, with the unu-
sual cooperation of a firm willing to share private cost and sales data.249
However, Ellison and Ellison explicitly sought to omit antitrust-related issues
by focusing on a market with many different competitors, and thus to calcu-
late only behavioral and informational overcharge.250
245 See, e.g., FTC Will Conduct Study of Generic Drug Competition, Seeks Input on Data Collec-
tion, 79 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1979 (Oct. 13, 2000) (discussing FTC
approaches to data collection); CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS:
SUMMER 2013, at 18–19 (2013) (detailing practicing for fair lending analyses).
246 See What You Should Know About EEOC’s Proposal to Collect Pay Data, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, (2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/proposal
_pay_data.cfm.  The privacy implications of collecting such data would need to be worked
out, and anonymization has limits.  Again, none of this is to say that privacy is a nonissue,
just that it is a solvable one if the purpose of information collection is sufficiently
important.
247 See Adam B. Thimmesch, Tax Privacy?, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 375, 383 (2018).
248 This combination would have the additional benefit of lessening the chances of
double counting overcharge related to consumer protection and antitrust if, for instance,
monopolies are more capable of earning overcharge related to consumer protection.
249 See Ellison & Ellison, supra note 74, at 428–29 (estimating the total overcharge
earned by a firm, and assuming that given the number of competitors all of the overcharge
was related to behavioral pricing).
250 See id.
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To understand the implications of overcharge, regulators could add
many other variables to the analysis.  Examining how lower overcharge would
influence income, employment rates, inflation, and other factors would paint
a fuller macroeconomic picture.  The different categories of consumer law,
and various measures of overcharge’s effects, present a menu of analytic
options available to regulators.
Macro analysis of consumer law could be implemented in varying ways,
but ultimately needs to be performance based in the sense of measuring the
intervention’s impact on overcharge market-wide.251  Ater and Rigbi’s esti-
mate of the impact of the Israeli statute mandating grocery store digital price
disclosures is an example of moving toward a macro performance-based
assessment, because it looks at the total price decrease witnessed across the
entire market.252
Each factor added moves to a more comprehensive analysis, but also one
that is more complex, resource intense, and potentially imprecise.  However,
these limitations are by no means prohibitive.  To minimize any illusion of
precision, for instance, the macro estimates should be accompanied by clear
statements of methodological limitations.253  Indeed, similar downsides are
present in many other macroeconomic analyses, such as for tax distribution
and Federal Reserve interest-rate adjustments, yet the government still makes
important decisions based on inevitably uncertain analyses.254  The FTC and
CFPB have groups filled with economists that could undertake these analyses,
or ideally a centralized macroeconomic institution could support all regula-
tors’ distributional analyses.255
251 The idea here would be strengthened by building on Lauren Willis’ proposal for
performance-based consumer law, in which the regulator measures the firm’s progress
toward a particular goal—such as reduced borrower confusion. See Willis, supra note 222,
at 1312–13 (“Field-testing of each firm’s customers would assess whether consumers under-
stand the key costs and risks of the transactions in which they are engaged.” (footnote
omitted)).  Rather than focusing on a particular firm’s performance, as Willis proposes, a
macro-level analysis measures the performance of a given regulatory intervention.  And
whereas Willis’s approach analyzes the micro-level transactions between a given firm and its
customers, a macro perspective examines the economy-wide impact of a policy
intervention.
252 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
253 See Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 613
(1995) (discussing how to minimize the illusion of precision in tax distribution analyses).
254 See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based
Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 534–35 (1995) (describing tax law execution chal-
lenges, including inaccuracy, unresponsiveness, and fraud); Graetz, supra note 253, at 613
(discussion of the illusion of precision that sometimes results from analyses of the implica-
tions of tax plans); Rebecca Haw, Adversarial Economics in Antitrust Litigation: Losing Aca-
demic Consensus in the Battle of the Experts, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1261, 1300 (2012) (discussing
experts in economic analyses); Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 174, 189 (2010).
255 Cf. YAIR LISTOKIN, LAW AND MACROECONOMICS 202 (2019) (proposing a law and
macroeconomics institution to ensure that “administrative agencies follow[ ] expert eco-
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To be clear, the idea is not to replace careful localized studies with
macro-level analysis.  To the contrary, macro consumer law analysis empha-
sizes obtaining the data to conduct micro-level overcharge studies in more
markets.  The immediate goal is to lessen decisionmakers’ current big-picture
imprecision about consumer law by connecting continued vital studies of spe-
cific markets with macro-level ramifications.
B. Making Distribution an Explicit Goal
A macro approach illuminates new rationales for consumer law interven-
tion. As Yair Listokin has argued, the law in diverse arenas insufficiently
engages in macroeconomic analyses.256  He observes that considering the
broader macroeconomic climate might lead to different legal outcomes.257
For instance, in times of recession, legal decisions should consider how to
increase aggregate demand, such as by forgiving student loans and lowering
utility rates even if such policies would not make economic sense at other
times.258
Listokin does not engage with consumer overcharge.  In theory, con-
sumer law interventions that reduce overcharge should not need
macroeconomic normative grounds because they have independent
microeconomic efficiency grounds.  However, this Article suggests that the
law—whether as written or as enforced—does not prevent large levels of
overcharge, possibly due to lobbying, insufficient information, a lack of
awareness of the magnitude, or other reasons.  The reduction of overcharge
is thus another path to increasing aggregate demand during recessionary
times because it would redistribute spending power from wealthier consum-
ers to middle- and low-income consumers.259  Lower-income consumers have
a higher propensity to spend an incremental dollar,260 meaning that reduc-
ing overcharge would raise spending and thereby reduce cyclical unemploy-
ment associated with inadequate aggregate demand.261  Moreover, consumer
law may stimulate demand in a way that is more attractive from a market
perspective than adjusting utilities rates or forgiving student loans because
reducing overcharge has the potential to improve markets.
Putting recessionary contexts aside, a macro perspective could still pro-
vide the foundations for consumer law intervention where a more micro-level
nomic advice”); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and
Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1339 (2013) (proposing review of agency inaction).
256 See LISTOKIN, supra note 255.
257 See id. at 175–80.
258 Id. at 187–89.
259 It would also redistribute from businesses to consumers.
260 See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS SERVS., HOW INCREASING INCOME INEQUALITY IS
DAMPENING U.S. ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND POSSIBLE WAYS TO CHANGE THE TIDE 3 (2014)
(concluding that inequality hinders growth, partly because low- and middle-income con-
sumers spend a larger portion of what they earn).
261 This relationship requires a number of assumptions, including that suppliers will
stay in the market after prices decrease.
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analysis would not.  Increasing efficiency is one of the strongest and most
broadly supported rationales for intervening in markets.262  However, the
consumer welfare efficiency analysis is driven by a micro-level analysis of a
given market that considers factors such as price, quantity, and demand.  In
that traditional analysis, a consumer law intervention that might be efficiency
neutral or slightly inefficient with respect to the market in question would be
disfavored, absent other considerations.
Through a more macro lens, however, even interventions that the tradi-
tional analysis identifies as having no efficiency benefits could still overall
prove economically desirable.  First, inequality can harm the economy by
holding back growth—even outside of recessionary periods, such as during
secular stagnation.263  Again, one reason for that relationship is that wealth-
ier households spend less of their money, so that the greater the percent of
national income that they earn, the less is spent overall in the economy.264
Inequality may also harm long-term growth by producing “a less-educated
workforce that can’t compete in a changing global economy.”265  Consumer
laws that would reduce inequality can thus strengthen economic growth.
Second, for a full analysis of the efficiency implications of a given con-
sumer law intervention it would be necessary to consider the alternative of
using an inefficient tax system.  Consider a consumer law intervention that
either had no effect on efficiency—as traditionally analyzed—or whose effi-
ciency consequences were too difficult to determine.  Such an intervention
would not immediately find support in the traditional analysis.  If that same
intervention would reduce inequality, however, it may still increase efficiency
by lessening the need for tax redistribution.266
To extend this logic a step further, consumer law interventions that
might appear inefficient based on a traditional analysis could overall prove
efficiency improving. The micro-level inefficiency of the consumer law would
need to be compared to the macro-level efficiency improvements.  The addi-
tional taxes, or government spending to address unemployment, that result
from inequality could overall harm efficiency more than an inefficient con-
sumer law intervention that reduced inequality.267  In that case, there would
be an efficiency justification for an intervention that would have otherwise
seemed inefficient from a micro-level perspective.
262 See supra Section I.A.
263 See STANDARD & POOR’S RATING SERVICES, supra note 258 (discussing the effect of
inequality on growth).  Secular stagnation is a long-run version of a recession that holds
back growth and output.
264 See id. at 3.
265 Id.
266 For a related and broader argument about factoring in the inefficiency of tax in
deciding how to address inequality, see Liscow, supra note 27.
267 On considering government spending on unemployment in the context of bank-
ruptcy law decisions of whether to liquidate a firm, see Zachary Liscow, Counter-Cyclical
Bankruptcy Law: An Efficiency Argument for Employment-Preserving Bankruptcy Rules, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1462 (2016).  Many efficient laws are regressive. See Zachary Liscow,
Is Efficiency Biased?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1649 (2018).
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It bears emphasis that the primary justification for regulating consumer
overcharge already exists and is well supported: to correct the market failures
that lead to the higher prices.  But a macro-level analysis also helps in
prompting consumer law action on that basis.  Lawmakers and regulators are
continually deciding how to allocate scarce public resources, including which
of many bills to pass or how many dollars to allocate to which administrative
agencies.  With a fuller perspective on consumer law’s economic implica-
tions, policymakers would have extra motivation to draft more vigorous con-
sumer laws and fortify administrative agencies.268  They could start with the
type of legislation that scholars have already found to work—extending the
CARD Act’s restriction of nonsalient fees to other markets, adopting a U.S.
version of the Israeli retail goods statute, or perhaps going further to man-
date nationwide price transparency.269  Congress would ideally also
strengthen the FTC’s rulemaking authority.270
Macro analyses can also inform the allocation of scarce public resources.
Currently, Congress allocates far fewer funds to consumer regulators than to
other issues.  For instance, the IRS has over 75,000 employees and the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) over 18,000.271  The two main regulators in
charge of consumer protection employ far fewer, with the CFPB at about
1600 employees and the FTC at 1100—despite the latter having broad anti-
trust and consumer protection responsibilities.272  The CFPB and FTC do
not necessarily require the same number of personnel as the FDA and IRS.
But since legislators currently make such decisions without a full sense of
consumer law’s impact they may be allocating resources to consumer regula-
tors at levels that harm the economy considerably.
A macro view would also help to prioritize enforcement actions and pri-
vate lawsuits that would have the greatest collective benefits.  Regulators have
great discretion in deciding how to allocate their resources, and when to take
action.273  Moreover, both the FTC and the CFPB already have a mandate
that allows them to consider the vulnerability of the party harmed, and
micro-level distributional issues are at the normative core of consumer pro-
268 Many substantive legal reforms could improve distribution. See, e.g., Ramsi A.
Woodcock, Big Data, Price Discrimination, and Antitrust, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1377 (2017)
(exploring antitrust options for redistribution).
269 See Van Loo, supra note 186, at 872–74 (calling for laws that allow digital
intermediaries to access an array of price, product, and personal data to help consumers);
cf. Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, The End of Bargaining in the Digital Age, 103 CORNELL L.
REV. 1469 (2018) (arguing for “mandated disclosure of past prices, and occasionally settle-
ments, where these have been negotiable”).
270 Congress restricted the FTC’s rulemaking in the 1980s.  FTC Improvements Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 15, 94 Stat. 374, 388 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1 (2018)).
271 U.S. Office Pers. Mgmt., Employment Cubes, FEDSCOPE, https://www.fedscope.opm.
gov/employment.asp (last visited Feb. 13, 2019).
272 Id.  This leaves out the Antitrust Division at the Department of Justice.
273 See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, Democratic Enforcement? Accountability and Independence
for the Litigation State, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 929, 947 (2017) (discussing enforcement discre-
tion); supra notes 229–30 and accompanying text.
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tection.274  In deciding among many possible activities that would advance
their missions, they and public attorneys at the state and local level can use
their discretion to consider distributional factors.  Even without engaging in
complicated macroeconomic analyses, authorities could already begin to
focus on certain categories of spending already demonstrated to have regres-
sive distributional effects, or that comprise a disproportionately higher per-
cent of low- and middle-income households’ budgets.
This Article has in some ways hewed more closely to traditional eco-
nomic motivations for intervention than has other scholarship on consumer
law and inequality.  Khan and Vaheesan argue that antitrust should “be
reoriented away from the current efficiency focus.”275  On the other hand,
they emphasize that their “argument is not that antitrust should embrace
redistribution as an explicit goal, or that enforcers should harness antitrust in
order to promote progressive redistribution.”276  Perhaps because micro-
level distribution is already imbedded in consumer law, observers rarely call
for consumer protection to explicitly pursue progressive distribution.  In con-
trast, the point here is that retaining the focus on economics and efficiency—
but expanding the inquiry to recognize how inequality may hurt spending
and efficiency—provides a normative basis for consumer law and its enforc-
ers to embrace redistribution as a goal.
Of course, for many the mobilization of the law to combat inequality
does not need an economic justification, and others have argued for leverag-
ing the law to reduce inequality for noneconomic reasons, such as fair-
ness.277  But for those unconvinced by moral arguments, it should be
274 Daniela Caruso, The Baby and the Bath Water: The American Critique of European Con-
tract Law, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 479, 492 (2013) (“Systematic market failures and systematic
redistributive problems are the bread and butter of behavioral law and economics.”); Rich-
ard Hynes, The Social Costs of Credit Reporting Errors, 11 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 329, 331 (2015)
(“A normative analysis of the regulation of credit reporting must account for distributional
consequences as well as the incentives of the industry participants to produce accurate
reports . . . .”); Sandeep Vaheesan, Resurrecting “A Comprehensive Charter of Economic Liberty”:
The Latent Power of the Federal Trade Commission, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 645, 648 (2017) (discuss-
ing administrative discretion related to distribution).
275 Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 22, at 238; see id. (proposing moving antitrust “toward
a broader understanding that aims to protect consumers and small suppliers from the
market power of large sellers and buyers, maintain the openness of markets, and disperse
economic and political power”).
276 Id.
277 The idea that the law should look beyond economic rationales to embrace distribu-
tional matters has deep roots. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Suppos-
edly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923); K. Sabeel Rahman, From Economic
Inequality to Economic Freedom: Constitutional Political Economy in the New Gilded Age, 35 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 321 (2016).  Nor are economics and fairness distinct. See, e.g., Robert Hock-
ett, Putting Distribution First, 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 157, 224 (2017) (stating that it is
incumbent to “take distribution seriously” and that maximizing efficiency inevitably
requires assumptions about distribution); Michael J. Meurer, Fair Division, 47 BUFFALO L.
REV. 937, 939 (1999) (aiming to “promote legal scholarship that incorporates fairness into
the economic analysis of law”).
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concerning that the failure to consider distributional factors likely causes
lawmakers to write, and regulators to enforce, in ways that fail to bring con-
sumer law’s full economic benefits to society.  “Correcting market failures,”
“improving the functioning of government,” and “removing distributional
unfairness” are three well-established justifications for regulation.278  By
adopting an explicit distributional goal and offering an institutional alterna-
tive to tax, consumer law would rest on stronger normative foundations.
CONCLUSION
Consumer law scholarship and reforms typically focus on a narrow con-
text, such as consumer financial protection or monopolistic prescription-
drug pricing.  Those careful studies and laws have laid the foundations for
bringing consumer law into dialogue with more macro-level policy issues.
The preliminary data suggest that overcharge is in the trillions and its elimi-
nation would have a meaningful progressive impact, possibly bringing
income inequality close to its lowest level over the past hundred years.
However, efficiency-improving consumer protection need not hurt the
wealthy in the long run.  Everyone is a consumer, and thus with lower over-
charge all households could purchase the same products for less.  Addition-
ally, more efficient markets and less inequality would grow the economy,
meaning that those who own businesses may ultimately be better off by earn-
ing a smaller portion of a larger pot of income.  The possibility of a more
stable society also appeals to all income groups.  Given the upside of more
competitive markets, it is not inconceivable that those who prioritize equity,
and those who prioritize efficiency, may agree on consumer law reforms that
could in the long-term benefit rich and poor alike.
The first step toward such a consensus is to understand the big picture
with greater precision.  Ideally, that analysis would fold antitrust, consumer
protection, and other procompetitive reforms—such as reducing entry barri-
ers—together into a holistic analysis of consumer overcharge.  Rather than
continuing to allow incomplete data to obscure one of the most pressing
issues of our time, agencies should take the routine step of exercising admin-
istrative authority to monitor overcharge.
A better understanding of overcharge is timely because in the wake of
growing concern over inequality, political leaders are increasingly designing
distributional policies.  The default choice for redistribution, tax law, no
doubt has institutional advantages in terms of the straightforward nature of
the transfer.  But it also has drawbacks, including inefficiency and political
stalemates.  A fuller institutional comparison would prove valuable.  Instead
of making that comparison, policymakers operate on the default assumption
that distributional planning should ignore consumer law, and that consumer
278 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4,
REGULATORY ANALYSIS 4 (2003), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/
omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf (putting forth guidelines for regulatory analysis under Presi-
dent George W. Bush).
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law should proceed without considering macro-level distribution.  Those
important assumptions are too important to leave as impressionistic rather
than empirically informed.
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